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Abstract
The present dissertation examines the phenomenon of political polarisation on social media.
Specifically, the dissertation addresses the question of how the intensity of polarisation and
the ideological lines along which it occurs might vary between different national contexts.
First, it explores the differences in the intensity of political polarisation on Twitter in 16
democratic  countries  (Article  1).  Second,  it  examines  the  ideological  lines  along which
polarisation occurs in two non-Western contexts, specifically among Russian (Article 2) and
Ukrainian (Article 3) users of Vkontakte – a social media platform popular among users
from post-Soviet states. The dissertation demonstrates that the levels of political polarisation
differ dramatically between countries.  In democracies,  polarisation tends to be lowest in
multi-party  systems  with  proportional  electoral  rules  (e.g.,  Sweden),  and the  highest  in
pluralist two-party systems (e.g., United States). It also shows that, in non-democratic non-
Western contexts,  polarisation does  not  necessarily  run along the  left–right  spectrum or
party  system  lines.  In  authoritarian  regimes  or  those  with  less  stable  party  systems,
polarisation runs along the lines of other issues that are more politically relevant in a given
context.  In  Russia,  polarisation  manifests  itself  along  pro-regime  vs  anti-regimes  lines,
whereas in Ukraine, polarisation happens around geopolitical issues. Polarisation on social
media thus tends to reflect existing political cleavages and their intensity, in line with the
theory of political parallelism. The major implication of this dissertation in the context of
research into polarisation on social media is that findings on the topic from single-country
studies that come from Western democratic contexts should be interpreted with caution, as
they  are  not  necessarily  generalisable.  To  make  generalisable  inferences  about  the
relationship between social media and political polarisation, more comparative studies are
needed,  as  well  as  studies  that  take  into  account  platform  affordances  and  the  causal
mechanisms that might drive polarisation.
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The rapid development of the Internet and social networking sites (SNS) at the end of the 20 th and
the beginning of the 21st centuries has made the world more interconnected than ever before. These
new  technologies  were  meant  to  help  people  get  in  touch  with  each  other  and  foster  mutual
understanding between them. As the creator of the World Wide Web, Tim Berners-Lee, said in one
of  his  interviews  in  the  early  2000s,  ‘The  original  idea  of  the  web  was  that  it  should  be  a
collaborative space where you can communicate through sharing information. The idea was that by
writing something together,  and as people worked on it,  they could iron out misunderstanding’
(BBC News, 2003). However, the Internet is not necessarily used in the ways its founding fathers
idealistically  imagined it  would be  (Curran  et  al.,  2012).  In  the  last  decades,  researchers  have
argued that the Internet and online platforms can not only help people connect with each other, but
also facilitate the spread of conspiracy theories and biases and increase societal polarisation (Allcott
& Gentzkow, 2017; Bail et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2018; Müller & Schwarz, 2018).
This dissertation primarily deals with the issue of polarisation on social media. Polarisation can
refer either to a state or to a process. ‘Polarisation as a state refers to the extent to which opinions on
an issue are opposed in relation to some theoretical maximum. Polarisation as a process refers to the
increase in such opposition over time’ (DiMaggio et al., 1996). In this dissertation, I focus primarily
on polarisation as a state. Another important term that needs to be defined is fragmentation, which is
a  division ‘into a  variety of groups … that  takes place along ideological  lines’ (Bright,  2018).
Hence, the main difference between polarisation and fragmentation, if both are understood as a state
rather than a process, is the number of groups into which a society or a larger group is divided.
Polarisation is division into two groups with opposite opinions, while fragmentation is a division
into  multiple  opinions  that  are  not  necessarily  in  direct  opposition  to  one  another  and are  not
mutually exclusive.
In  political  communication,  the  problem  of  polarisation  and/or  fragmentation  is  frequently
discussed in connection with phenomena such as selective exposure and echo chambering, as both
can lead to increased polarisation (Quattrociocchi et al., 2016; Stroud, 2010). Selective exposure is
people’s  tendency  to  tune  into  information  and  news  that  aligns  with  their  existing  (political)
attitudes  (Prior,  2002).  The  term  echo  chambering refers  to  situations  in  which  people  are
surrounded by information that is in line with their views, thus amplifying partisan opinions; this
phenomenon can be facilitated by selective exposure as well as homophily – people’s tendency to
surround themselves with others who are similar to them in certain characteristics, e.g., holding
similar beliefs (Garimella et al., 2018; Sunstein, 2001).
Research on selective exposure and the cognitive and psychological mechanisms behind it has been
around for a long time. For instance, Festinger (1957) argued within the framework of his cognitive
dissonance  theory  that,  when  people  are  presented  with  counter-attitudinal  information,  they
experience a cognitive dissonance and thus process new information less fluently. One way to avoid
dissonance is, Festinger suggested, to engage in selective exposure. Cognitive dissonance is now
widely  recognised  as  one  of  the  main  drivers  of  selective  exposure  (Stroud,  2011),  and  the
phenomenon has been well-researched since 1957 – when Festinger mentioned it in relation to his
theory – in numerous studies that prove that people tend to select information that aligns with their
views and avoid information that is in opposition to their beliefs (e.g., Frey, 1986; Hart et al., 2009;
Smith  et  al.,  2008).  A more  recent  study relying  on data  about  users’ browsing behaviour  has
confirmed that people tend to prefer content that is congruent with their beliefs, but, overall, users’
information diets tend to be ideologically diverse (Dvir-Gvirsman et al., 2014).
In recent years, the phenomenon has gained new prominence, particularly among communication
scholars, due to the changes in the information environment. Since the advent of online media – and
social media in particular – people have been presented with an abundance of information to choose
from. In scholarly terms, people are currently living in a high-choice media environment in which
political  polarisation  and fragmentation is  of  particular  concern,  since  ‘changes  in  the political
information  environment  have  created  opportunity  structures  for  selective  exposure  based  on
political attitudes and beliefs’ (Van Aelst et al., 2017).
Social  media  is  especially  often  discussed  in  the  context  of  concerns  about  polarisation  and
fragmentation. There are two reasons why SNSs are relevant in this regard: first, they provide users
with an abundance of content to choose from, including content created by other users, and second,
algorithmic  curation  of  news  feeds  can  affect  what  content  users  see,  presenting  them  with
information  similar  to  what  they  engaged  with  before  (Berman  & Katona,  2016).  Despite  the
abundance of research on the topic, the evidence on the issue is still inconclusive. Some research
argues that SNSs increase polarisation, since high-choice environments created by social media and
curation algorithms strengthen the effects of selective exposure, leading to echo chambering and
increased partisanship (Bail et al., 2018; Conover et al., 2012; Garimella et al., 2018; Grömping,
2014; Gruzd & Roy, 2014; Hindman, 2009; Levendusky, 2013; Quattrociocchi et al., 2016). Others
have provided evidence  that  SNSs can  decrease  polarisation,  as  people  on these  platforms  are
exposed to cross-cutting news because a) they are embedded in ideologically diverse networks, if
one takes into account both their strong and weak ties (Barberá, 2014); b) social media algorithms
‘feed’ them more cross-cutting content than they would see if they selected the information to tune
into themselves, thus alleviating the effects of selective exposure (Bakshy et al., 2015); c) social
media users most often navigate to a few well-known outlets with diverse audiences rather than to
the less-known highly partisan ones (Nelson & Webster, 2017); and d) polarisation is manifested
only when highly politicised issues are taken into account (Barberá et al., 2015). Thus, although
polarisation on social media is a seemingly well-researched phenomenon, there is still no academic
consensus around it.
The main argument of this dissertation is that the levels of polarisation on social media and the lines
along which people are polarised vary greatly from one (political) context to another. In this sense,
polarisation on social media is in accordance with the idea of the political parallelism – that media
systems reflect (national) political divisions (Hallin & Mancini, 2004).
I suggest that contextual differences are the key to answering the question of why previous studies
on polarisation on social  media have found very different results.  The absolute  majority of the
studies that found evidence of strong political polarisation on social media along left–right lines
were conducted in the US context (Bail et al., 2018; Conover et al., 2012; Garimella et al., 2018;
Hindman, 2009; Levendusky, 2013; Quattrociocchi et al.,  2016), with two notable exceptions: a
study that examined the Canadian context (Gruzd & Roy, 2014) and a study that focused on Thai
political groups on Facebook (Grömping, 2014). Hence, the majority of studies have examined the
case of a two-party system that is itself extremely polarised along left–right lines (Bateman et al.,
2017; Iyengar et al., 2019; Poole, 2008).
Another point  common to the studies that  found evidence of polarisation on SNSs is  that they
focused on the political  Facebook- and Twitter-spheres (e.g. accounts and groups of politicians,
parties or their active supporters and political discussions that people consciously decide to follow
or  engage  in;  incidental  exposure,  such  as  through  algorithmic  curation,  was  not  taken  into
account). The studies that did not find strong evidence of polarisation on SNSs, in contrast, took
into account less politicised users and topics and not just political partisans or highly politically
engaged users, as in those studies that found polarisation on social media (Barberá et al., 2015;
Nelson  &  Webster,  2017),  and  examined  incidental  exposure  to  political  information  through
algorithmic recommendations (Bakshy et al., 2015).
It seems that political polarisation in previous studies was observed only among highly politicised
users. The results of such studies are not generalisable to the overall population of SNS users in a
given  country.  I  suggest  that  this  limitation  can  be  overcome in  further  studies  by  relying  on
samples of randomly selected social media users rather than those engaged in political discussion or
following politicised sources. Examples of specific research designs relying on such sampling are
given in Articles 2 and 3 in this dissertation. Another problem with the existing body of research on
polarisation on social media is that most of the evidence collected, with few exceptions, comes from
the very politically polarised context of the United States; there are almost no studies that look at
the problem from a comparative perspective. The two exceptions are Barberá (2014), who found
that  social  media  usage  can  decrease  polarisation  because  users  are  typically  embedded  in
ideologically diverse networks, with the level of diversity being slightly higher among German and
Spanish users than US ones, and Bright (2018), whose analysis of Twitter exchanges among users
from 26 countries found that groups that are closer to each other on the ideological spectrum are
more likely to interact than those further apart.  None of the existing studies, to my knowledge,
examined  polarisation  on  platforms  other  than  Facebook  and  Twitter.  Finally,  all  of  the
aforementioned studies measured polarisation either within the ideological context of the left–right
spectrum or along political party lines. Even though this approach might work well for established
liberal democracies with relatively stable party systems, I suggest it  would not work as well in
contexts in which the main societal  cleavages occur along different lines. As I illustrate below,
examples  of  such  contexts  include  authoritarian  regimes,  those  in  transition,  and/or  those
profoundly affected by bigger geopolitical cleavages.
This dissertation aims to partially fill the research gap by looking at political polarisation from a
comparative perspective (Article  1),  in  non-Western contexts  (Articles 1,  2 and 3),  and among
randomly selected users of a non-Western platform (Articles 2 and 3). The general research question
of this dissertation is
Does polarisation on social media substantially vary across national contexts in terms of intensity
and the ideological lines along which it occurs?
All  the  articles  that  comprise  this  dissertation  rely  on  a  network-analytic  audience  duplication
approach (Ksiazek, 2011) to measure polarisation of social media users that has been successfully
employed by other studies for similar purposes (e.g., Fletcher et al., 2019; Mukerjee et al., 2018;
Webster  &  Ksiazek,  2012).  It  allows  measurement  of  audience  polarisation  using  aggregated
observations about the patterns of selective exposure among audiences as a proxy. The approach, in
contrast to other methods of measuring selective exposure, allows inferences to be made about the
patterns on the population level (Clay et al., 2013), making it especially relevant for the questions
explored  in  this  dissertation.  However,  the  interpretation  of  results  depends  on  the
operationalisation of the ideological positions of the information sources, which, for certain studies,
might be disadvantageous, since the results are highly dependent on the researchers’ interpretations
(Clay et al., 2013). However, given that this dissertation explores not just the variance in the levels
of polarisation, but also the differences in the ideological lines along which these phenomena occur
in  different  national  contexts,  this  flexibility  of  the  audience  duplication  approach  makes  it
particularly useful.
Below, I briefly outline the content of each of the three articles included in this dissertation, then
discuss the implications of the findings as well as the limitations of the dissertation.
Short Summary of the Three Articles That Comprise the Dissertation
The first article, entitled ‘Context Matters: Political Polarization on Twitter from a Comparative
Perspective’, examined polarisation among the audiences (in this case, followers) of the accounts of
political parties in 16 democratic countries. In this study, I did not rely on random sampling, but on
a sample of politically engaged users, as their polarisation tends to be more pronounced (Barberá,
2014).
In the study, I constructed audience duplication graphs using the audience duplication approach
(Ksiazek, 2011), based on the data about the Twitter followers of each political party represented in
the country’s parliament. Then, according to the graphs’ topologies, the political Twitter-spheres of
the  countries  included  in  the  study  were  classified  as  perfectly  integrated,  integrated,  mixed,
polarised, and perfectly polarised. This procedure was followed by an exploratory analysis of the
results that suggested that polarisation is highest in two-party systems with plurality electoral rules
(e.g., the United States) and lowest in multi-party systems with proportional voting (e.g., Sweden).
The second article is entitled ‘News Consumption of Russian Vkontakte Users: Polarisation and
News Avoidance’.  This  study examined the  patterns  of  news consumption  of  Russian  users  of
Vkontakte,  which  is  the  most  popular  social  media  platform in  Russia  and certain  post-Soviet
countries. The analysis was based on a randomly selected sample of 55,344 profiles of Vkontakte
users whose online self-reported place of residence is Russia. The analysis was performed using a
combination of network-analytic techniques – specifically, audience duplication (see above) and
community detection using the Louvain method (Blondel et al., 2008).
The study showed that the majority of Vkontakte users do not subscribe to news sources,  thus
demonstrating that social media users are divided into a politically apathetic majority and a news-
interested minority that is polarised along political lines. However, the polarisation does not occur
along the left–right spectrum, as in the United States and some other Western democracies, but
along the pro-government vs anti-government lines. In this article, the inductive approach to the
definition of the ideological stances of media outlets was used. Instead of relying on a pre-defined
ideological scale (i.e., the left–right spectrum), I first established whether the users in the sample
can be divided into distinct groups by applying network-analytic techniques to the data regarding
their subscription patterns. Then, after qualitatively assessing the resources that are characteristic of
the media consumption of each group, I established the ideological lines along which polarisation
occurs.
The third  article  that  is  a  part  of  this  dissertation  is  entitled  ‘There  Can Be Only  One Truth:
Ideological  Segregation  and  Online  News  Communities  in  Ukraine’,  which  examined  political
polarisation among Ukrainian users of Vkontakte who subscribe to different online news pages. The
analysis was based on a randomly selected sample of 50,702 users whose self-reported place of
residence is Ukraine (including Crimea).
We used  an  audience  duplication  approach  and  community  detection  (similar  to  Article  2)  to
examine the patterns of the users’ news consumption and to identify whether there is evidence of
political  polarisation among the users.  We found that  the users tend to be polarised along pro-
Russian  vs  pro-Ukrainian/pro-European  lines.  For  the  analysis,  we used  the  same approach  to
establish the ideological lines of polarisation as in Article 2. In addition, we manually coded the
most popular pages in our sample in order to 1) separate news communities from the rest (i.e.
entertainment pages) and 2) determine the ideological orientation (pro-Russian partisanship, pro-
Ukrainian/pro-European partisanship or neutral) of each news page. The latter was necessary to
allow a regression analysis to be performed to determine the factors that predict subscription to
partisan pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian/pro-European media pages.
We found that  the most  important factors  are one’s declared region of residence (e.g.,  Western
Ukraine or Eastern Ukraine) and self-reported language abilities (e.g., Ukrainian/Russian/both). We
also found that, despite the low number of partisan news pages relative to the communities of other
types in the sample, the share of Ukrainian users subscribing to them is disproportionately high,
meaning that these few communities attract substantial  attention.  Furthermore,  the audiences of
these  communities  showed  minimal  overlap,  thereby  indicating  that  they  can  encourage  the
formation of isolated ideological cliques – or ‘echo chambers’.
Implications and Limitations
The three articles that constitute this dissertation demonstrate that both the levels of polarisation and
the lines along which that polarisation occurs vary dramatically from one country to another. The
findings show that, in democracies, the intensity of left–right polarisation on SNSs varies greatly
and the variation can be at least partially attributed to the differences in national political systems.
Two-party pluralist systems tend to have the highest levels of polarisation among Twitter users,
while the multi-party ones with proportional electoral rules tend to be the least polarised.
With  regard  to  the  ideological  lines  along  which  polarisation  occurs,  in  non-Western  non-
democratic contexts, the left–right spectrum or party systems might be of less relevance than pro-
government vs anti-government stances, ongoing geopolitical and internal conflicts, or religious or
linguistic  differences.  For  instance,  in  authoritarian  states  such  as  Russia  (Schenkkan,  2018),
politically interested users can be divided into pro-government vs anti-government groups, and in
Ukraine – a country transitioning to democracy (Schenkkan, 2018) – the population is strongly
polarised along lines marked by current internal political and geopolitical cleavages, intensified by
the conflict with Russian armed forces and Russia-backed separatists in the east of Ukraine. In this
case, linguistic and regional differences that are associated with the different sides of the conflict
are also correlated with the partisanship manifested on SNSs. Hence, in all of the cases examined in
this dissertation, existing political divisions are reflected on social media, in line with the ideas of
political parallelism (Hallin & Mancini, 2004).
A group of researchers who examined polarisation in 12 democratic countries – not among social
media users but among offline and online news audiences – demonstrated that polarisation in the
examined countries is highest in the United States and, in Europe, is higher on average in pluralist
countries than in those with proportional voting (Fletcher et al., 2019). That study did not deal with
SNSs, and its selection of countries was slightly different than that in Article 1 of this dissertation,
but the findings point in the same direction as those in Article 1. This suggests that social media
audiences are polarised in the same ways as news audiences and societies in general, providing
another argument in support of the idea that social media, just like other media, reflects the political
sphere of a given country.
Since polarisation on social media reflects existing political divisions, studying polarisation – or
other political phenomena – on SNSs has to take the national political context into account. More
comparative studies are needed to better understand the phenomenon. Single-country studies can
provide valuable information about the levels and lines of polarisation in a given national context,
but researchers should be careful when interpreting their results and refrain from generalising the
effects observed in a given country to social media overall.
Polarisation on social media has mostly been studied in the context of the United States (Bail et al.,
2018;  Bakshy  et.  al,  2015;  Conover  et  al.,  2012;  Garimella  et  al.,  2018;  Hindman,  2009;
Levendusky, 2013; Quattrociocchi et al., 2016) – a highly politically polarised society. Given that, it
is  no wonder  that  previous studies have found evidence of extreme polarisation of Twitter  and
Facebook audiences. The findings of this dissertation suggest that one should interpret the results of
US-focused single-country studies with caution. Even if one finds evidence of selective exposure
and echo chambering on SNSs in the US context, the observed phenomena might be driven by
national social and political mechanisms rather than by the nature and algorithms of social media
platforms.  The  present  study  demonstrates  that  not  all  countries  experience  the  same  level  of
polarisation on social media as the United States.
To be able to state whether social media drives polarisation, comparative studies that also examine
the causal aspects of this problem are necessary. One of the limitations of the present dissertation is
that it does not analyse causal mechanisms. Based on the findings, one can argue that polarisation
varies across countries and that the variation is at least partially associated with political differences.
However, one cannot make any conclusions about the role of SNSs. The question of whether social
media exacerbates societal polarisation or alleviates it is still open. Further comparative research on
the causal aspects of the issue is necessary to answer it.
This dissertation has also demonstrated that,  in non-democratic contexts, polarisation can occur
along  lines  other  than  the  left–right  spectrum.  Hence,  one  has  to  be  careful  when  analysing
polarisation in such contexts and especially when including them as cases in comparative studies.
Since nations have different polarising issues, it is not always possible to make direct comparisons
between them. When studying non-Western, non-democratic contexts, it is futile to apply the same
measures  as  one  applies  to  Western  democracies.  New measures  –  designed  with  attention  to
national contexts – must be used to avoid biased and inaccurate results. For example, if one were to
measure polarisation in Russia or Ukraine by relying on the measures traditionally used in US-
focused  studies,  such  as  by  looking  at  partisanship  along  the  left–right  spectrum  or  at  party
partisanship,  one  would  likely  find  that  the  levels  of  polarisation  in  those  countries  are  low.
However, as this dissertation shows, that is not the case, as the left–right division is not a polarising
issue in those countries and the party systems do not reflect the most pronounced cleavages. In the
case of Russia, for instance, there is no officially registered party that would reflect the anti-regime
position.  In  the  case  of  Ukraine,  the  existing  parties  also  do  not  necessarily  fully  reflect  the
ideological divisions, and party partisanship is not very strong – for instance, the  Servant of the
People party that won the parliamentary elections by a landslide in the summer of 2019 was created
only months ahead of the election. If there were strong party partisanship, a new party would not be
able to attract so many votes from the citizens who used to vote for other parties in such a short
period.
This raises the question of how researchers should operationalise and measure polarisation across
countries. Since the phenomenon is very contextual, it is unlikely that a universal measure can be
created. It is possible to measure polarisation or audience fragmentation across countries using the
audience duplication approach (see Article 1 of this dissertation; Fletcher et. al., 2019). However,
that is only possible when polarisation or fragmentation occur along the same ideological lines in all
the cases included in a comparative study. When the lines of polarisation are different, the levels of
polarisation inferred using the audience duplication approach are not necessarily comparable, since
the  interpretation  of  the  results  in  studies  that  use  this  methodology  is  very  sensitive  to  the
operationalisation of the ideological stances of the information sources (Clay et al., 2013). I suggest
that  the  problem  of  creating  a  cross-country  generalisable  measure  of  polarisation  and
fragmentation is a matter for further academic debate. More comparative studies might help answer
the question of whether or not the levels of polarisation measured with a focus on different issues
can be directly compared across countries, but, for now, it remains open.
Finally, this dissertation has looked at polarisation on a non-Western platform. All of the previous
studies on polarisation on SNSs have focused on Facebook and Twitter.  The studies conducted
within  this  dissertation  prove  that  the  methods  used  for  the  analysis  of  polarisation  and
fragmentation of news media audiences and Western platforms’ audiences – in this case, network-
based audience duplication analysis (Fletcher et al., 2019; Ksiazek, 2011; Mukerjee et al., 2018;
Webster & Ksiazek, 2012) – can be successfully applied to other platforms as well. This suggests
that studies on other platforms are not just necessary, but can also be quite easily implemented using
existing  techniques.  Besides,  conducting  studies  on  such  platforms  might  be  easier  than  on
Facebook and Twitter due to data availability – in the context of Western platforms, academics are
stepping into what can be called a ‘post-API age’ (Freelon, 2018), with the platforms making their
APIs  increasingly  restrictive  or  completely  shutting  them  down.  Less  popular  non-Western
platforms remain, for now, more open in this respect.
Though this dissertation looked at polarisation on a non-Western platform on which this issue has
not  been  examined  before,  one  of  the  limitations  is  that  the  dissertation  does  not  include
comparative analysis between the non-Western platform and one of the better studied Western ones.
It might be that polarisation is manifested differently on them. As noted above, polarisation on
SNSs tends to be reflective of existing political conflicts, but the intensity and accuracy of this
reflection might be different. In non-Western contexts in which different – foreign and national –
social media with similar architectures coexist, the levels of politicisation of the platforms – the
share  of  politically  engaged  users  and/or  political  discussions  on  a  given  platform –  can  vary
greatly. For instance, in Russia, Western platforms (e.g., Facebook and Twitter) have traditionally
been more politicised than national ones (e.g., Vkontakte) and used by more politically engaged
audiences (Gainous et al., 2018). Hence, it might be that the intensity of polarisation varies greatly
not just across countries, but also across platforms, especially given that, even in the United States,
no evidence of polarisation has been found when less politicised audiences are analysed (Barberá et
al., 2015).
The contextual  differences  between  platforms  are  especially  relevant  if  one  takes  into  account
platform affordances (Bucher & Helmond, 2018) – things that SNSs allow one to do by virtue of
their  architecture.  It  might  be that  the platform affordances on one social  media site can drive
polarisation while those on another decrease it. I suggest that cross-platform comparative research
that considers the causal mechanisms that might be driving polarisation is needed to address this
question, but, until then, it would be difficult to make a case that social media drives polarisation.
SNSs, just like countries, are different, and it would be wrong to make general statements about the
influence of  social  media on polarisation until  there is  evidence that  all  – or at  least  the most
popular  –  platforms  function  similarly  in  relation  to  the  issue  and  have  the  same  effects  on
polarisation.
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Abstract
This article explores the issue of political polarization on social media. It shows that 
the intensity of polarization on Twitter varies greatly from one country to another. 
The analysis is performed using network-analytic audience duplication approach and is 
based on the data about the followers of the political parties’ Twitter accounts in 16 
democratic countries. Based on the topology of the audience duplication graphs, the 
political Twitterspheres of the countries are classified as perfectly integrated, integrated, 
mixed, polarized and perfectly polarized. Explorative analysis shows that polarization is 
the highest in two-party systems with plurality electoral rules and the lowest in multi-
party systems with proportional voting. The findings help explain the discrepancies in 
the results of previous studies into polarization on social media. The results of the 
study indicate that extrapolation of the findings from single-case studies on the topic is 
impossible in most cases, suggesting that more comparative studies on the matter are 
necessary to better understand the subject and get generalizable results.
Keywords
audience duplication, comparative analysis, network analysis, political polarization, 
social media, Twitter
The sweeping development of the Internet and other technologies, including the emer-
gence of social networking sites (SNS), in the last decades, has led to a drastic increase 
in the amount of information available to an average person and made the world more 
interconnected than ever before. However, there is strong evidence that the technologies 
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that were meant to connect and educate people can, on the contrary, increase polarization 
in the society, facilitate the spread of conspiracy theories and fake news, and even incite 
violent hate crimes (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017; Bail et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2018; 
Müller and Schwarz, 2018). Still, other researchers suggest that social media can, in fact, 
reduce polarization in society and the effects of partisanship with regard to the news 
consumption (Barberá, 2014; Messing and Westwood, 2014). Hence, the evidence on the 
polarizing nature of social media is contradictory.
In this article, I suggest that the contradictions in the previous findings on polarization 
on SNS can be explained by the differences in local contexts. In particular, I suggest that 
the levels of polarization on social media differ from country to country, depending, 
among other, on the overall levels of polarization in different societies.
The hypothesis of this study, thus, is that the intensity of political partisanship on SNS 
varies significantly in different countries.
To test this hypothesis, I conducted a comparative analysis of the political 
Twitterspheres of 16 countries (the full list is in Table 1) using a network-based audi-
ence duplication approach (Ksiazek, 2011; Webster and Ksiazek, 2012). Based on the 
topology of the graphs representing the levels of audience duplication of the official 
Twitter accounts of political parties in each country, I established the intensity of 
polarization in political Twitterspheres in different countries. Then, I accordingly 
divided the examined countries into five categories: perfectly integrated, integrated, 
mixed, polarized and perfectly polarized. This study adds up to the growing body of 
literature on the relationship between social media and politics and strives to bridge 
the gap between the contradictory findings on the relationship between social media 
and political polarization.
Polarization and social media
Scholars have shown that social media usage can lead to increased polarization in 
societies by reinforcing partisan political attitudes (Conover et al., 2012; Gruzd and 
Roy, 2014; Hong and Kim, 2016; Levendusky, 2013; Shin and Thorson, 2017; Sunstein, 
2017; Tucker et al., 2018). There is an extensive body of research on the individual-
level behavioural characteristics that can contribute to the increased partisanship and, 
as a consequence, polarization (see Colleoni et al., 2014, for the research overview). 
They include selective exposure – people’s tendency to pick news sources and infor-
mation that align with their views (Prior, 2002) – and homophily – people’s tendency 
to surround themselves with individuals who are similar to them in several character-
istics such as gender, socio-economic status and political orientations (McPherson 
et al., 2001). Selective exposure and homophily in turn can prompt echo chambering 
– situations when users’ beliefs are amplified as they are continuously exposed to the 
information that goes in line with their views and thus reinforces them (Garimella 
et al., 2018; Sunstein, 2001). Scholars demonstrate that social media users frequently 
form such ideologically segregated communities (see Bail et al., 2018; Conover et al., 
2012; Garimella et al., 2018; Grömping, 2014; Hindman, 2009; Levendusky, 2013; 
Quattrociocchi et al., 2016), and through these can become more partisan and polar-
ized (Gruzd and Roy, 2014).
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At the same time, there is a body of research showing that, based on the same individ-
ual-level mechanisms, social media can actually decrease users’ partisanship and, conse-
quently, polarization. This can happen when users are embedded in politically diverse 
networks and thus, through weak ties, exposed to ideologically diverse information 
(Barberá, 2014). Or due to the fact that social media algorithms ‘feed’ users more cross-
cutting hard news and political information than they would see if they relied only on the 
sources they chose to follow themselves (Bakshy et al., 2015). In addition, Nelson and 
Webster (2017) challenge the perceived effects of SNS on polarization by showing that 
Facebook users navigate mostly to several well-known outlets, most of which comprise 
ideologically diverse audiences and share the audiences with each other as well as with 
smaller and more extreme media. Finally, there is evidence that in the United States, 
political polarization has increased the most among the demographic groups least likely 
to use SNS, suggesting that the effects of SNS on polarization are weaker than generally 
assumed (Boxell et al., 2017).
As Bright (2018) points out, the individual-level mechanisms outlined above do not 
explain the variation in polarization levels between different groups. For that, an exami-
nation of macro-level factors is necessary. This is, however, difficult since comparative 
studies on polarization on SNS are almost non-existent (Bright, 2018, is a notable 
Table 1. Countries included in the analysis, sorted by the democracy index score.











% of the 
total 
population
Sweden Proportional Multi 9.39 243,473 2.4
Denmark Proportional Multi 9.22 94,333 1.6
Australia Plurality Two 9.09 243,338 0.98
Switzerland Proportional Multi 9.03 49,818 0.59
Germany Proportional Multi 8.61 836,718 0.97
United 
Kingdom
Plurality Two 8.53 1,271,674 1.9
Austria Proportional Multi 8.42 119,037 1.4
Uruguay Proportional Two 8.12 101,815 2.9
Spain Proportional Multi 8.08 2,279,866 4.9
South Korea Mixed: 253 seats plurality, 
47 seats proportional
Two 8.00 349,918 0.67
United States Plurality Two 7.98 2,698,608 0.82
Italy Mixed: 193 seats 
proportional, 116 seats 
plurality, 6 seats – a quota 
for Italians residing abroad
Multi 7.98 949,410 1.6
Japan Mixed: 295 seats plurality, 
180 seats proportional
Multi 7.88 397,159 0.31
Portugal Proportional Multi 7.84 65,365 0.63
France Majoritarian (two rounds) Multi 7.80 835,323 1.2
Jamaica Plurality Two 7.29 16,979 0.58
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exception). Most of the research on the phenomena is focused on the United States (and 
exceptions such as Grömping, 2014, and Gruzd and Roy, 2014, are still single-country 
studies).
Concentration on the United States, especially on the politicized online communities, 
could affect the results of the studies, as the United States has a highly polarized two-party 
political system (Poole, 2008; Poole and Rosenthal, 1984). Elite polarization significantly 
alters the patterns of opinion formation, intensifying the influence of partisanship on one’s 
opinions and decreasing the effects of substantive information (Druckman et al., 2013). 
Thus, the political context of the United States rather than the effects of social media itself 
can potentially explain the presence of echo chambers and strong political polarization on 
SNS in the United States found by some researchers.
This argument is supported by the fact that the studies conducted in the US context, 
which concluded that social media does not have polarizing effects, were considering 
users’ social media and media consumption in general rather than focusing just on 
political content (Bakshy et al., 2015; Barberá, 2014; Nelson and Webster, 2017). The 
argument that the intensity of polarization on SNS depends on the political context is 
indirectly backed by the comparative study of the Twitter discussion activities of 115 
political groups in 26 countries that showed the connection between the levels of frag-
mentation on social media and the distance between the political groups on the ideo-
logical scale (Bright, 2018).
I suggest that though social media itself might have effects on the strength of political 
polarization among users, the intensity of polarization among politically engaged users 
on the same social media platform varies in different political contexts, just like overall 
levels of societal and political polarization differ from one country to another. This vari-
ance, if present, can be explained by macro-level factors such as the differences in the 
characteristics of countries’ political systems.
Hypothesis
The hypothesis tested in this study is that levels of political polarization on social media 
vary from country to country.
Besides simply testing the hypothesis, I aim to explore possible explanations behind 
the variance in the intensity of polarization. Of specific relevance is a possible connec-
tion between the level of polarization observed on SNS and the country’s party system 
(multi-party vs two-party) and local electoral rules (majoritarian vs proportional).
The first aspect is of particular interest since, as noted above, the vast majority of the 
studies that explored the relationship between SNS and political polarization and found 
evidence that social media users are polarized focused on the United States. However, 
the United States presents just a single case, and if polarization on SNS is indeed contex-
tual, the evidence from the United States cannot be universally generalizable. Second, 
the United States is a highly polarized two-party system which, even when taking into 
account only democratic countries, is not a very typical case, meaning that the US-based 
findings are of limited application to other countries if the polarization on SNS depends 
on the local political context. Exploration of the possible connection between party sys-
tems and polarization levels will allow making more informed conclusions about the 
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scope of applicability of the evidence from the United States to other countries, depend-
ing on local party systems.
Examination of the potential relationship between electoral systems and polarization 
on social media is motivated by the studies that have found evidence that majoritarian 
electoral systems tend to have higher degrees of polarization among voters than propor-
tional ones, with the effect being most evident in systems with plurality electoral rule 
(Bernabel, 2015; Blais and Carty, 1991; Cincea, 2016).
Methodology
Case selection
For the present study, I selected 16 democratic (Democracy Index, 2017, democracy 
score is seven or above) countries with different electoral rules. The countries were 
selected in a way to make the sample geographically balanced (including the countries 
from East, West, global North and global South). Since this study aims to test whether 
polarization on SNS is contextual, it was necessary to select countries from different 
cultural contexts. At the same time, as I also seek to explore the potential connection 
between the levels of polarization on SNS and party systems and electoral rules, I decided 
to include only democratic countries in the sample. Otherwise, the variance in the polari-
zation intensity could be attributed to other factors. The full list of the countries included 
in the study is in Table 1 below. It also shows the number of unique Twitter users in the 
sample for each country and the corresponding share of the total population of the 
country.
Out of the 16 countries included in the study, eight have a proportional electoral rule 
and another eight have majoritarian, plurality or mixed electoral systems. Since previous 
research suggests that overall polarization is lower in countries with proportional elec-
toral rule (Bernabel, 2015; Blais and Carty, 1991; Cincea, 2016), I expect that to be 
reflected on social media data as well, and the countries with proportional systems to 
have the most integrated political Twitterspheres. Six countries in the sample have two-
party systems and the remaining ten countries have multi-party systems. I will examine 
whether there are clear-cut differences in the levels of polarization observed for these 
two categories.
Data and method
The analysis relies on Twitter data collected in September–October 2018 using Twitter’s 
REST API and R package ‘twitteR’ (Gentry, 2016). I downloaded the lists of the parlia-
mentary parties’ official accounts’ followers for each of the 16 countries included in the 
study. In some instances, however, I omitted minor regional parties (e.g. The Social 
Democratic Party; Inuit Ataqatigiit; Republic; Nunatta Qitornai in the case of Denmark). 
The primary reason for that is that these parties are of relatively negligible political influ-
ence in general and have very few followers on Twitter, and some of them (e.g. Nunatta 
Qitornai) are separatist. Including them in the analysis would add a regional dimension 
that is not relevant for the present study, given that the real influence of the respective 
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political parties is marginal. Also, the fact that these parties target very specific and small 
shares of the electorate could significantly alter the results of the study due to the nature 
of the applied approach. They would not have significant audience overlaps with other 
parties because of their marginal presence in the online political sphere, and their inclu-
sion would not help shed light on the levels of political polarization on SNS for a country 
in general. The full lists of parties that are included in the study for each country are 
found in the ‘Results’ section. There are notes on the cases where minor parties were 
omitted. I used official Twitter accounts of the parties in the analysis, where not specified 
otherwise.
In this study, I focus only on Twitter users who are subscribed to official accounts of 
political parties. This implies a significant selection bias. The sample includes highly 
politically engaged users and is not representative of the general population of the stud-
ied countries. However, for the present study, these data are relevant for two reasons. 
First, the aim is to examine political polarization on SNS, not in society overall. Twitter 
suits this purpose as, for users, it is an important platform for political expression and for 
getting news (Velasquez and Rojas, 2017). Second, in previous studies, polarization was 
found on Twitter only among politically engaged users, not the general population 
(Barberá, 2014). Thus, to detect political polarization at all and compare its levels in dif-
ferent countries, it is, in fact, necessary to look at politically engaged users, not at more 
general samples.
To analyse the collected data, I used the audience duplication approach (Ksiazek, 2011; 
Webster and Ksiazek, 2012). This network-analytic approach has been successfully 
applied to study the fragmentation and political polarization in media environments. This 
approach was used to explore patterns of polarization between the audiences of partisan 
news outlets (Ksiazek, 2016), to study audience fragmentation across media platforms 
(Fletcher and Nielsen, 2017) and to examine selective exposure and audience fragmenta-
tion among online news audiences (Mukerjee et al., 2018; Nelson and Webster, 2017).
Though audience duplication approach has not been used before to study polarization 
and audience fragmentation among the social media audiences of different political par-
ties, I suggest it is applicable to the parties’ official Twitter accounts as well, since they are 
in essence a form of new media. According to the audience duplication approach, media 
environments can be either fragmented or duplicated. The intensity of fragmentation/
duplication is inferred from the level of audience overlap between each pair of media 
outlets in the environment. If many outlets share audiences, the environment is described 
as duplicated. Otherwise, it is fragmented. Strong fragmentation might indicate that the 
media environment is polarized (Ksiazek, 2011; Webster and Ksiazek, 2012).
In the present study, I treat official Twitter accounts of political parties as media out-
lets and their followers as audiences. The audience duplication approach is relevant in 
this case, as it allows to see how fragmented the Twitterspheres of politically engaged 
users are in different countries and infer the corresponding levels of polarization. The 
designed scale of polarization according to the strength of audience fragmentation is 
described in the end of this section.
I constructed audience duplication graphs for each of the 16 countries included in the 
analysis. In these graphs, each node represents an official Twitter account of a political 
party that has seats in the country’s parliament. There is a connection between two nodes 
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if they have overlapping followers on Twitter. Certain overlapping, though, could occur 
by chance (Ksiazek, 2011). For the two nodes to have a connection, the level of overlap-
ping audiences has to be beyond the ‘by chance’ threshold. It is determined by multiply-
ing the shares of Twitter users in the general sample who follow each account. For 
instance, if party A is followed by 30% of users out of the total sample for the corre-
sponding country and party B is followed by 20% of users, the expected ‘by chance’ 
audience overlap between them would be 6% (0.3 × 0.2). The A and B nodes in the 
resulting audience duplication graph will be connected only if the actual level of audi-
ence overlap between them is higher than 6% (the same approach to ‘by chance’ duplica-
tion was used by Fletcher and Nielsen, 2017; Ksiazek, 2011; Webster and Ksiazek, 
2012). The edges in the resulting audience duplication graphs are weighted. The higher 
is the level of audience duplication between two nodes, the thicker is the edge that con-
nects them. The resulting graphs were visualized using Gephi.
According to the topology of the resulting audience duplication graphs, I divided the 
countries’ political Twitterspheres into five categories:
•• Perfectly integrated – the graph is complete (each pair of nodes in the graph is 
connected).
•• Integrated – the graph is connected but not complete (all nodes are connected to 
each other by paths, but not necessarily directly connected as in complete graphs).
•• Mixed – the graph is disconnected, but the nodes representing major political par-
ties are directly connected with each other; alternatively, the graph is connected, 
but the nodes representing major political parties are not connected with each 
other.
•• Polarized – the graph is disconnected and the nodes representing major political 
parties are not directly connected with each other.
•• Perfectly polarized – there are no connections between the nodes of the parties’ 
audience duplication graph (all nodes are isolated).
Results
The results of the audience duplication analysis demonstrate that the levels of polariza-
tion vary from country to country, confirming the main hypothesis of the present study. 
Out of the total sample of 16 countries, based on the topology of audience duplication 
graphs, one can be described as perfectly integrated, three as integrated, three as mixed, 
six as polarized, and three as perfectly polarized. Below I present a more detailed over-
view of the results for each country. This section is divided into five subsections, one for 
each polarization category. The summary of the findings is in the end of the section.
Perfectly integrated
Only one country included in the present study is classified as having a perfectly inte-
grated political Twittersphere. It is Denmark, which is a unitary state with a propor-
tional rule and a multi-party system. The corresponding audience duplication graph is 
in Figure 1.
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The audience duplication graph in the Danish case is complete (each pair of nodes is 
connected). It means that the official Twitter accounts of all major political parties in 
Denmark share audiences with each other. The Twittersphere that comprises politically 
engaged users is thus perfectly integrated. It has to be noted, however, that the minor 
regional parties from Faroe Islands and Greenland (The Social Democratic Party; Inuit 
Ataqatigiit; Republic; Nunatta Qitornai) were not included in the analysis.
Integrated
Political Twitterspheres of three countries are integrated as corresponding audience 
duplication graphs are connected but not complete. The countries are Sweden, Switzerland 
and Germany. All of them have proportional electoral systems and are multi-party sys-
tems. Relevant audience duplication graphs are in Figures 2 to 5.
The graph that represents Sweden is almost complete as just one pair of nodes is not 
connected. The only two parties that do not share audiences on Twitter are Social 
Democrats and right-wing populist Sweden Democrats. Hence, Swedish political 
Twittersphere is almost perfectly integrated. Judging from the levels of audience dupli-
cation, Sweden Democrats, in fact, are well integrated into the Swedish political 
Twittersphere. This finding is counterintuitive since, on the political arena, all other par-
ties, not just Social Democrats, refuse to cooperate with Sweden Democrats (Reuters, 
2018). Politically engaged Swedish Twitter users, however, do not refrain from follow-
ing Sweden Democrats, hinting that attitude to this party on the audience side might be 
different from that on the elite level.
Figure 1. Audience duplication graph, Denmark.
SD: Social Democrats, 46 seats in the parliament (179 in total);1 DFP: Danish People’s Party, 37 seats; V: 
Venstre, 34 seats; RGA: Red-Green Alliance, 14 seats; LA: Liberal Alliance, 13 seats; A: Alternative, 10 
seats; DSLP: Social Liberal Party, 8 seats; SFP: Socialist People’s Party, 7 seats; CFP: Conservative People’s 
Party, 6 seats.
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Graphs representing Switzerland and Germany reveal less-integrated political 
Twitterspheres than that of Sweden. Each of them has a node that is almost isolated and 
has only one connection to the otherwise complete graph. In case of Switzerland, this 
Figure 2. Audience duplication graph, Sweden.
SD: Swedish Social Democratic Party, 100 seats in the parliament (349 in total); M: Moderate Party, 70 
seats; SWD: Sweden Democrats, 62 seats; C: Centre Party, 31 seats; L: Left Party, 28 seats; CD: Christian 
Democrats, 22 seats; LIB: Liberals, 20 seats; G: Green Party, 16 seats.
Figure 3. Audience duplication graph, Switzerland.
SVP: Swiss People’s Party, 65 seats in the National Council (200 in total); SP: Social Democratic Party, 43 
seats; FDP: FDP.The Liberals, 33 seats; CVP: Christian Democratic People’s Party, 27 seats; Green: Green 
Party, 11 seats; BDP: Conservative Democratic Party, 7 seats; GL: Green Liberal Party, 7 seats.
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node corresponds to Social Democratic party. In case of Germany, it is the far-right 
Alternative for Germany (AfD).
The topology of the German graph could be explained by two facts: (a) AfD is a rela-
tively young party that has entered the German political arena only recently; (b) AfD has 
Figure 4. Audience duplication graph, Germany.
CDU: Christian Democratic Union, 200 seats in Bundestag (709 in total); SPD: Social Democratic Party, 153 
seats; AfD: Alternative for Germany, 92 seats; FDP: Free Democratic Party, 80 seats; Linke: The Left, 69 
seats; GR: The Greens, 67 seats; CSU: Christian Social Union in Bavaria, 46 seats.
Figure 5. Audience duplication graph, Uruguay.
FA: Broad Front, 50 seats in the Chamber of Representatives (99 in total); PN: National Party, 32 seats; PC: 
Colorado (Coloured) Party, 13 seats; PI: Independent Party, 3 seats; AP: Popular Assembly, 1 seat.
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extremely far-right rhetoric which is different from that of the other parties. Given that, 
in other countries, recently founded parties are well integrated (e.g. the Constitutional 
Democratic Party (CDP) of Japan), the second explanation is more plausible. Another 
argument in favour of the second explanation is that AfD shares audiences only with 
Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU), which is the closest to AfD in terms of 
ideology.
The Swiss case is not as straightforward. Social Democrats are in no way a marginal 
party in Switzerland. In fact, they are the second-largest one. Their rhetoric is not 
extreme, unlike that of AfD. The observed isolation of the Swiss Social Democrats is 
thus not very easy to explain, especially given that their only connection to the main 
network is through the marginal Green Liberal Party. Though Social Democrats support 
environmentalist policies, it is not clear why they share audiences only with centrist 
Green Liberals, but not with the more leftist and thus ideologically close Green party.
Mixed
Three countries fall in the ‘mixed’ category: Uruguay, Japan and Spain. Uruguay has a 
two-party system with proportional electoral rules. Japan has a mixed electoral system 
(see Table 1) and Spain has a proportional one, both are multi-party systems. The corre-
sponding audience duplication graphs are in Figures 5 to 7. In cases of Japan and Spain, 
both graphs are disconnected (they have isolated nodes or several disconnected 
Figure 6. Audience duplication graph, Japan.
LDP: Liberal Democratic Party, 283 seats in the House of Representatives (465 in total); CDP: Consti-
tutional Democratic Party, 55 seats; DPP: Democratic Party for the People, 39 seats; NKP: Komeito, 29 
seats; COM: Japanese Communist Party, 12 seats; ISH: Japan Innovation Party (Ishin), 11 seats; SPD: Social 
Democratic Party, 2 seats; LIB: Liberal Party, 2 seats; H: Party of Hope, 2 seats.
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components), but these cases still cannot be classified as strictly polarized since the 
nodes representing major political parties are connected to each other. In the case of 
Uruguay, the Twittersphere is connected. However, the two major parties (Broad Front 
and National Party) in this two-party system do not share a connection. Thus, this case 
cannot be described as integrated.
The graph of audience duplication in Uruguayan political Twittersphere is connected; 
hence, this case cannot be called polarized even though the two major parties do not 
share a connection, hinting at overall polarization, given that Uruguay has a two-party 
system. Furthermore, the largest party – Broad Front – has just one connection to the 
others. It is through Popular Assembly – a minor party that was formed in 2006 through 
splitting from Broad Front. Thus, the graph topology indicates that there is a certain 
degree of polarization between the dominant Broad Front and other parties, and if not for 
the connection through Popular Assembly, the Uruguayan political Twittersphere would 
be classified as polarized.
The graph corresponding to the Japanese political Twittersphere is almost connected. 
The only isolated node represents the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) that was 
formed in 2018. The fact that the party is very new could account for its isolation. Still, 
similarly to the case of German AfD, I suggest that is not the main explanation. For 
instance, CDP is quite well integrated in the Twittersphere despite that, same as DPP, it 
split from the oppositional Democratic party just half a year before DPP. Thus, I suggest 
the reason behind the DPP’s isolation is its ideological position. The party can be 
described as centrist which makes it distant on the ideological scale from both, the more 
leftist opposition represented by the most interconnected part of the graph and the right-
wing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Komeito, and Ishin. Also, even though the graph 
Figure 7. Audience duplication graph, Spain.
PP: People’s Party, 104 seats in the Congress of Deputies (350 in total); PSOE: Spanish Socialist Workers’ 
Party, 84 seats; POD: Podemos, 67 seats; C: Ciudadanos, 32 seats; ERC: Republican Left of Catalonia, 9 
seats; PDC: Catalan European Democratic Party, 8 seats. Minor regional parties such as the Basque Nation-
alist Party were not included in the analysis.
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is connected, a certain degree of ideological polarization is evident in the Japanese case: 
the ruling right-wing LDP has connections only to the rightist Komeito (in ruling coali-
tion with LDP) and more radical right-wing Ishin.
In Spain, the two biggest parties – People’s Party (PP) and Spanish Socialist Workers’ 
Party (PSOE) – have a strong connection. Hence, the level of audience duplication 
between these two parties on Twitter is high. Given that PP is a centre-right party that at 
the time of data collection was in the opposition and PSOE is a centre-left party that was 
in the governing coalition, this indicates that overall Spanish political Twittersphere is 
not extremely polarized. But the third major party, the left-wing populist Podemos, is 
represented by an isolated node. The followers of Podemos are distant from the other part 
of the political Twittersphere, which includes not just PP and PSOE, but also the Catalan 
political parties of varying ideological orientations. The Spanish political Twittersphere 
is not fully integrated since Podemos is isolated, but it cannot be called truly polarized as 
well because all the other parties’ official accounts have shared audiences, including the 
European Democratic Party of Catalonia that promotes the Catalonian independence.
Polarized
Six countries included in this study were classified as polarized: Italy (Figure 8), France 
(Figure 9), the UK (Figure 10), Australia (Figure 11), Portugal (Figure 12) and Austria 
(Figure 13). The graphs representing these countries’ political Twitterspheres are dis-
connected, and the majority of direct connections are between the nodes representing 
ideologically similar parties.
Figure 8. Audience duplication graph, Italy.
FS: The Five Star Movement, 227 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (465 in total); L: Lega Nord, 125 seats; 
PD: Democratic Party, 112 seats; FI: Forza Italia, 104 seats; FRA: Brothers of Italy, 32 seats; LU: Free and 
Equal, 14 seats. Minor regional parties were not included in the analysis.
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Italian political Twittersphere reflects a case of polarization in a multi-party system. 
The only three parties that share audiences on Twitter are the three right-wing parties. 
Other parties stand on different ideological positions and, as the data suggest, their 
Twitter audiences do not overlap.
France is another example of a polarized political Twittersphere in a multi-party sys-
tem. But while Italy has a mixed electoral system, France has a majoritarian one. Until 
the 2017 elections, there were two dominant parties in the French system, Socialists and 
Republicans. However, in, 2017, the party of Emmanuel Macron, La République En 
Marche (RM), won the elections, and the two traditional parties lost their leadership. 
Judging from the topology of the graph, this development could have added up to the 
polarization in the French political Twittersphere. The traditional majority parties share 
audiences with each other and with other parties except for the far-left ones. RM is rep-
resented by an isolated node, which might indicate that though it now has the majority in 
the National Assembly, there is a divide between this newly emerged political force and 
the traditional French political scene.
The graphs representing the British and the Australian Twitterspheres are very similar. 
In both cases, the major parties (Conservatives and Labour in the United Kingdom; 
Liberals and Labour in Australia) do not share audiences. However, they have connec-
tions to minor middle-ground parties – Liberal Democrats in the United Kingdom and 
National Party in Australia. The latter ones also share audiences with the local Green 
parties. The most plausible explanation of the similarities between the two graphs is that 
Figure 9. Audience duplication graph, France.
RM: La République En Marche, 311 seats in the National Assembly (577 in total); REP: The Republicans, 112 
seats; DM: Democratic Movement, 42 seats; UDI: Union of Democrats and Independents, 32 seats; SOC: 
Socialist, 30 seats; FI: La France Insoumise, 17 seats; COM: French Communist Party, 10 seats; NR: National 
Rally (former National Front), 8 seats. Minor parties that have five seats or less were not included in the 
analysis.
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the political systems of the two countries are very much alike. Both have plurality elec-
toral rules and two major parties. The similarities are evident since Australia in a sense 
inherited its party system from the United Kingdom and follows the British model in this 
respect. The main difference between the two graphs is contextual. In the British case, 
Figure 10. Audience duplication graph, the United Kingdom.
CON: Conservative Party, 316 seats in the House of Commons (650 in total); LAB: Labour Party, 257 seats; 
SNP: Scottish National Party, 35 seats; LD: Liberal Democrats, 12 seats; DU: Democratic Unionist Party, 9 
seats; Sinn Fein, 7 seats; PC: Plaid Cymru, 4 seats; GP: Green Party, 1 seat.
Figure 11. Audience duplication graph, Australia.
LAB: Labour Party, 69 seats in the House of Representatives (150 in total); LIB: Liberal Party, 59 seats; N: 
National Party, 16 seats; KAP: Katter’s Australian, 1 seat; CA: Centre Alliance, 1 seat; G: Australian Greens, 
1 seat.
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there is one more connected component, representing two parties from Northern Ireland 
– a reflection of regional divisions and conflicts that are not present in Australia.
The countries already mentioned in this section have either mixed or majoritarian 
electoral systems, and countries with proportional electoral rules so far were classified 
as having either integrated or mixed political Twitterspheres. However, Portugal has a 
multi-party proportional system but still is clearly polarized along the political lines. 
There are two major parties (Social Democratic Party (PSD) and Socialist Party (SOC) 
on the graph) that share audiences neither with each other nor with the minor left-wing 
parties. I suggest that the high level of audience fragmentation in the Portuguese politi-
cal Twittersphere can be explained by the presence of two strong parties with diverging 
ideological positions (PSD is centre-right while SOC is centre-left). As demonstrated 
by the British and Australian cases above and Jamaican, South Korean and the US 
cases below, countries that have two dominant parties tend to have polarized online 
political spheres.
Austria, similarly to Portugal, has a proportional electoral rule and a multi-party sys-
tem. Still, its political Twittersphere is extremely polarized. Only the liberal NEOS – The 
New Austria and Liberal Forum shares audiences with the traditionally dominant 
People’s Party and Social Democratic Party. Considering the ideological orientations of 
all the parties represented in the Austrian parliament, the only compelling explanation of 
the observed topology of the graph lies in the data. Unlike other countries and parties, the 
Freedom Party of Austria and Peter Pilz List do not have official Twitter accounts. 
Personal accounts of their leaders – Heinz-Christian Strache and Peter Pilz, respec-
tively,– are used to communicate the parties’ messages to the public. This discrepancy in 
the data might account for the fact that the nodes representing these two parties are 
isolated.
Figure 12. Audience duplication graph, Portugal.
PSD: Social Democratic Party, 89 seats in the Assembly of the Republic (230 in total); SOC: Socialist Party, 
86 seats; BE: Left Bloc, 19 seats; PP: People’s Party, 18 seats; COM: Communist Party, 15 seats; G: Greens, 
2 seats; PAN: People-Animals-Nature, 1 seat.
Urman 17
Perfectly polarized
Three countries have perfectly polarized political Twitterspheres: the United States 
(Figure 14), Jamaica (Figure 15) and South Korea (Figure 16). The first two have plural-
ity electoral rule and a two-party system. South Korea has a mixed electoral system and, 
though there are multiple parties in the parliament, de-facto the power is divided between 
the two major parties as the country’s political system was very much affected by the 
United States. The case of South Korea is still outstanding since the country, unlike the 
other two perfectly polarized cases, has multiple parties in the parliament, not just the 
Figure 13. Audience duplication graph, Austria.
OVV: Austrian People’s Party, 61 seats in the National Council (112 seats in total); SPO: Social Democratic 
Party, 52 seats; FPO: Freedom Party of Austria, 51 seats; NEOS – The New Austria and Liberal Forum, 10 
seats; PP: Peter Pilz List, 7 seats. FPO and PP do not have official accounts; therefore, the accounts of their 
leaders, Heinz-Christian Strache and Peter Pilz, respectively, were used in the analysis instead.
Figure 14. Audience duplication graph, the United States.
GOP: The Republicans, 235 seats in the House of Representatives (435 in total); DEM: The Democrats, 193 
seats. Seven seats are vacant.
Figure 15. Audience duplication graph, Jamaica.
JLP: Jamaica’s National Party, 33 seats in the House of Representatives (63 in total); PNP: People’s National 
Party, 30 seats.
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two dominant ones (similarly to the United Kingdom and Australia). Still, none of them 
share Twitter audiences. The reason behind this extreme polarization is not entirely 
apparent and is a potential subject for further analysis.
Summary
The levels of polarization in the political Twitterspheres of the 16 countries included in 
the present study vary significantly from country to country (see Table 2). Properties of 
the audience duplication graphs are in Table 3. The empirical data thus support the main 
hypothesis of the present study.
All countries that can be classified as having perfectly integrated or integrated politi-
cal Twittersphere have proportional multi-party systems. On the contrary, two countries 
with proportional multi-party systems – Portugal and Austria – still fell in the ‘polar-
ized’ category. Out of the three countries in the ‘mixed’ category, two have multi-party 
Figure 16. Audience duplication graph, South Korea.
MJD: Democratic Party, 129 seats in the National Assembly (300 in total); JD/S: Liberty Korea Party (former 
Saenuri), 112 seats; BD: Bareunmirae, 30 seats; PDP: Peace and Democracy, 14 seats; JU: Justice Party, 5 
seats; MD: Minjung, 1 seat; KPP: Korean Patriots, 1 seat.
Table 2. Distribution of countries’ political Twitterspheres by polarization categories.
Category No. of 
countries
countries
Perfectly integrated 1 Denmark
Integrated 3 Sweden, Switzerland, Germany
Mixed 3 Uruguay, Japan, Spain
Polarized 6 Italy, France, United Kingdom, Australia, Portugal, Austria
Perfectly polarized 3 United States, Jamaica, South Korea
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systems (one proportional, one majoritarian) and one has a proportional two-party 
system.
The data thus suggest that countries with proportional multi-party systems have lower 
levels of polarization than countries with other systems. But since the study is based on 
a relatively small sample, it is not possible to make a definitive conclusion about the con-
nection between electoral rules, party systems and polarization on SNS.
Discussion
This study has demonstrated that the levels of polarization among politically engaged 
Twitter users vary significantly from country to country. This finding can help explain 
the contradictions in the results of different studies that explored political polarization on 
social media. Since the intensity of polarization on Twitter is contextual, more compara-
tive studies are necessary to infer the effects of social media platforms themselves on 
political polarization.
Findings on the matter from single-case studies have limited application since, as 
shown in this article, levels of polarization vary greatly. Among the factors that can 
potentially explain this variation are countries’ electoral rules and party systems. As 
polarization on SNS is highly contextual, conclusions based on single-case studies can-
not be extrapolated to other countries. For example, the present study shows that polari-
zation in the US political Twittersphere is extreme and similar polarization intensity is 
found only in Jamaica and South Korea, one of which has a two-party system, and 
another one has a multi-party system that is nonetheless dominated by two antagonized 
Table 3. Characteristics of audience duplication graphs by country.
Country No. of nodes No. of edges Density No. of weakly 
connected components
Sweden 9 33 0.917 1
Denmark 9 36 1 1
Australia 7 3 0.143 4
Switzerland 7 16 0.762 1
Germany 7 16 0.762 1
United Kingdom 8 4 0.143 4
Austria 5 3 0.300 3
Uruguay 6 6 0.400 2
Spain 7 7 0.333 3
South Korea 7 0 0 7
United States 2 0 0 2
Italy 6 3 0.200 4
Japan 9 12 0.333 2
Portugal 6 4 0.267 2
France 8 4 0.143 4
Jamaica 2 0 0 2
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parties. This result suggests that findings on polarization and social media from the 
United States have limited generalizability, which is of utmost relevance since most 
research on the subject is in fact conducted in the US context. The findings of the present 
study thus indicate that previously made suggestions about the connection between 
social media and polarization should be put into context and, in some cases, reconsid-
ered. It is not possible to generalize the majority of the findings on the matter since they 
are based on single-case studies.
The explorative analysis of the potential effects of party systems and electoral rules 
on polarization demonstrates that countries with two-party proportional systems exhibit 
relatively low levels of polarization on SNS, while the countries with two-party plurality 
systems appear to be the most polarized. I suggest that this hints at a connection between 
party systems and electoral rules and online polarization. Further analysis is necessary, 
though, to make a definitive conclusion about such connection and to assess which other 
factors might be predictors of polarization intensity on SNS. Results of such studies 
would allow to better understand the variations in the levels of polarization and to find 
out the conditions under which findings from one country can be extrapolated to another 
(e.g. if the two countries have similar electoral rules and party systems).
This study has significant limitations that are to be addressed in the future to get more 
comprehensive and generalizable results. First, it looked only at a particular group of 
Twitter users: those subscribed to the official accounts of political parties. Still, as noted 
in the ‘Methodology’ section, the high level of selection bias, in this case, is justified 
since politically engaged users are the ones among who polarization is most evident 
(Barberá, 2014). However, to broaden the scope of the analysis in the future, it would be 
relevant to include users subscribed to partisan media and politicians’ accounts as well. 
That would allow getting a more comprehensive view of the political Twitterspheres of 
the countries in question. Second, the suggestions about the relationship between the 
electoral rules and polarization are based on the general overview of the levels of polari-
zation in countries with different electoral systems. No statistical tests were conducted as 
the number of countries included in the sample was too small for a meaningful statistical 
analysis. In the future, this limitation is also to be addressed to get more robust results. 
Third, I did not control for the actual places of residence of the followers of different 
parties. It might be that there is a significant share of foreigners among the followers of 
the political parties in countries like the United States or the United Kingdom, which 
could be a potentially confounding factor with regard to the findings of this study. Finally, 
I looked only at the potential relationship between levels of polarization on SNS and 
electoral rules and party systems. I suggest, however, that more factors could explain the 
variations in the polarization intensity on SNS such as inequality, levels on trust in the 
government and/or media or polarization of the elites. Analysis of the relationship 
between polarization on social media and these and other factors in the future can help to 
distinguish the effects social media platforms themselves have on polarization levels 
from the influence of contextual factors.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their suggestions that helped me to improve this 
article. Besides, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr Silke Adam, for her feedback that helped 
Urman 21
me shape the idea behind this article and strengthen the arguments; Teresa Gil-Lopez and Dmitrii 
Dremanovich for consulting me on the particular aspects of political systems in Spain and Japan, 
respectively; and Stefan Katz for his comments on the initial version of this article and continuous 
support.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this 
article.
ORCID iD
Aleksandra Urman  https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3332-9294
Note
1. Hereafter, the distributions of seats for all parties and countries as well as the descriptions of 
political situations are given as of September–October 2018, when the data were collected.
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Besides expanding the research on polarization on social media beyond Western platforms and 
contexts, examining the news consumption in the Russian segment of Vkontakte sheds light on the 
perspectives and limitations of social media sites as news dissemination and political mobilization channels 
in a consolidated authoritarian regime. SNS can be helpful tools for protest mobilization in authoritarian 
regimes (Ruijgrok, 2017), but they can also be used by authoritarian governments to push forward their 
agenda and silence dissent (Gunitsky, 2015; Pearce & Kendzior, 2012; Tufekci, 2017). 
 
In this study, I first present the state of research on polarization manifested in echo chambering 
and selective exposure, as well as on news dissemination through social media in authoritarian regimes. I 
also describe the role played by social media in the protest mobilization in Russia over the past decade. 
Next, I outline my research question and hypotheses. Finally, I conduct empirical analysis, applying network 
analysis techniques to the data on 55,344 Russian users of Vkontakte. 
 
Selective Exposure and Polarization 
 
The growth in the amount and the variety of available media in recent decades has made it easier 
for people to find news sources that are consistent with their attitudes (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, 
Schwarz, & Cook, 2012). In these high-choice media environments, people tend to demonstrate partisan 
biases in consumption, choosing only media sites that align with their views (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). The 
phenomenon in which people seek information that supports their existing beliefs and avoid information that 
contradicts them is called selective exposure (Stroud, 2008). 
 
The psychological underpinnings of selective exposure are related to cognitive dissonance. When 
presented with information that is inconsistent with their beliefs, people feel uncomfortable (Festinger, 
1957). To avoid unpleasant feelings, they try to expose themselves only to information that aligns with their 
values and attitudes (Klapper, 1960). Another psychological explanation for selective exposure is that people 
employ it as a strategy to reduce their cognitive efforts put into information processing (Smith, Fabrigar, & 
Norris, 2008). People’s information-processing capacities are limited (Lang, 2000), and information that is 
consistent with their existing beliefs is easier to process (Edwards & Smith, 1996). Thus, selective exposure 
helps people save their mental resources and avoid cognitive overload. Empirical evidence confirms that 
selective exposure is present on social media platforms (An, Quercia, Cha, Gummadi, & Crowcroft, 2014; 
Grömping, 2014). Besides engaging in selective exposure, people demonstrate the tendency for homophily—
that is, surrounding themselves with individuals who have characteristics similar to theirs, such as gender, 
socioeconomic status, moral values, and political orientations (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). 
 
Selective exposure and homophily in the online sphere might lead to the formation of the so-called 
echo chambers—communities of like-minded individuals where people are exposed to opinions and ideas 
consistent with their views—which in turn can increase polarization (e.g., Garimella, Morales, Gionis, & 
Mathioudakis, 2018; Grömping, 2014; Sunstein, 2001). A growing body of research, however, contests 
polarizing effects of echo chambering and selective exposure on social media, showing that SNS can diversify 
users’ media diets and make them less polarized through incidental exposure to opposing opinions and 
increased access to media with different types of political stance (Barberá, 2015; Dubois & Blank, 2018; 
Flaxman, Goel, & Rao, 2016; Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018; Nelson & Webster, 2017). The scholarly debate on 
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the intensity of selective exposure and echo chambering and their potentially polarizing effects is thus 
ongoing. However, to date, research on these phenomena has focused on Twitter and Facebook in the 
context of Western liberal democracies, primarily the U.S. Nonetheless, the evidence from these contexts 
has limited generalizability. It does not apply to other platforms and to states with different political 
systems—for instance, authoritarian regimes. At the same time, understanding how information is 
consumed on social media in authoritarian states is of critical importance. The SNS in such countries play a 
crucial role in civic mobilization and circumvention of censorship by providing channels of news dissemination 
to the opposition and independent media. Because political systems in authoritarian countries are very 
different from those of liberal democracies, polarization on social media there, if manifested, is also likely 
to occur along different lines. Although research based on the data from U.S. finds evidence of left-wing 
versus right-wing polarization, in authoritarian regimes it is more likely to occur along the progovernment 
versus pro-opposition lines. Therefore, research on political polarization on SNS in different contexts and 
different platforms is pivotal for a better understanding of the phenomena in general. 
 
Social Media Platforms as News Disseminators in Authoritarian Regimes 
 
SNS and the Internet are positively correlated with the protest potential, especially in authoritarian 
regimes (Howard et al., 2011). Nonetheless, these channels are just tools—what really matters is the 
content spread through them. Ruijgrok (2017, p. 17) identifies four causal mechanisms that explain how 
the Internet, through increased access to information, leads to more protests in authoritarian regimes: (1) 
lowering the risk to the opposition in coordinating demonstrations, (2) changing citizens’ attitudes by 
exposing them to alternative information, (3) removing information uncertainty among potential protestors, 
and (4) presenting users with videos and pictures, which can be especially powerful. Besides, social media 
helps activists circumvent the mainstream media “blackout” and attract public attention (Breuer, Landman, 
& Farquhar, 2015). 
 
Though social media increases people’s access to information and can have a mobilizing effect on 
citizens in authoritarian regimes, contemporary autocrats have learned how to use the new technologies in 
pursuit of their own interests. For instance, China and Russia practice what is referred to as networked 
authoritarianism; they leverage “ICTs [information and communication technologies] and media regulation 
to carefully control the expression of dissent in a way that gives the impression of limited freedom of 
expression without allowing dissent to gain traction” (Maréchal, 2017, p. 36). Autocratic regimes resort to 
censorship by disinformation—not by trying to block certain content, but rather by distracting citizens from 
it by flooding online public spheres with fake news and trivialities (Tufekci, 2017). They also compete with 
online dissent and try to undermine the credibility of the online media that presents accurate information 
(MacKinnon, 2011; Maréchal, 2017; Pearce & Kendzior, 2012). 
 
Research on censorship in authoritarian regimes shows that the aim of propaganda is not only 
indoctrination but also a signal to the public that the state is strong enough, thus discouraging citizens from 
revolting (Huang, 2015) and convincing them that the autocrat is sufficiently competent to govern (Guriev 
& Treisman, 2015). 
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Previous research on the role of social media in authoritarian regimes, as outlined above, suggests 
the following: (1) Social media is a powerful tool for disseminating information and circumventing 
censorship; (2) SNS have political mobilization potential because access to the political information provided 
by social media can lead to the mobilization of users who were exposed to such information; and (3) 
autocratic governments aim to censor social media to curb mobilization potential, not to stop the spread of 
information per se. 
 
Examining the consumption of political content—including hard news—in authoritarian states is 
necessary to better comprehend how the mechanisms described above work in practice and interplay with 
phenomena such as selective exposure and polarization on SNS observed in other contexts, in case these 
phenomena are manifested among social media users in authoritarian states as well. 
 
Background Information: Russia and Vkontakte 
 
The hypotheses presented in this study are partially built on the characteristics of the Russian social 
media sphere in general, and the examined Vkontakte platform in particular. Thus, before moving on to the 
hypotheses, I briefly outline these characteristics and my reasons for choosing Russia and Vkontakte as the 
constituents of this case study. 
 
In 2011, only 49% of Russians had Internet access (World Bank, n.d.); 20% and 7% named online 
media and social media, respectively, among their primary news sources, whereas 92% said that TV was 
their primary source of news (“Istochniki informatsii,” 2017). Since 2011, the level of Internet penetration 
in Russia has increased significantly, as well as Russians’ eagerness to rely on social media for the news. In 
2016, 73% of Russians had Internet access (World Bank, n.d.). In 2018, 21% and 27% of Russians, 
respectively, said that they obtained their news from social media and online media (Levada Center, 2018). 
 
On the one hand, the increase in the number of Internet and social media users should have 
increased the protest mobilization potential of SNS because information from pro-opposition actors 
circulated on social media in 2019 has a potentially broader reach than it had in 2011. On the other hand, 
since 2011, the Russian government has increased its efforts to obstruct the use of social media for protest 
mobilization (see Klyueva, 2016; Reuter & Szakonyi, 2015; Sanovich, Stukal, & Tucker, 2018; Soldatov & 
Borogan, 2015; Tselikov, 2014). Despite the growth from 7% in 2011 to 21% in 2018, the percentage of 
people relying on social media for news is still meager compared with those in other countries (see, e.g., 
Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 2018). 
 
Despite the relatively low levels of social media usage in 2011 and the increased control over the 
Internet in subsequent years, Russia has witnessed two waves of SNS-enabled protests—one in 2011–12 
and the other in 2017. The exact role of different social media platforms in the 2011–12 protest mobilization 
is disputable. Some researchers argue that Western social media platforms, namely Facebook and Twitter, 
were the most crucial to the Russian protests of 2011–12, and Russian social media platforms, such as 
Vkontakte or Odnoklassniki (odnoklassniki.ru), were of negligible importance (Gainous, Wagner, & Ziegler, 
2018; Reuter & Szakonyi, 2015; White & McAllister, 2014). Others demonstrate that Vkontakte usage also 
increased its mobilization potential (Enikolopov, Makarin, & Petrova, 2016). Nonetheless, there is unilateral 
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agreement about the importance of SNS for protest mobilization. Researchers have argued that increased 
control over the Internet in Russia has hindered its protest mobilization potential (Reuter & Szakonyi, 2015). 
However, the massive social-media-enabled protests of 2017 contradict this view. In 2017, the largest 
protest action since 2012 occurred on March 26, when the opposition leader Alexey Navalny, who is de facto 
banned from appearing on national TV or the major state media (Ragozin, 2017), called for the protests 
through SNS (Sebastian, 2017). 
 
The Russian social media sphere can be perceived as a battlefield between the state and pro-
opposition activists, making it a particularly relevant case for the study of news consumption and polarization 
on SNS in contexts other than liberal democracies. In this article, I focus on news consumption on the 
Russian social media platform Vkontakte. In December 2017, 65% of social network users in Russia were 
registered on Vkontakte, while only 20% and 7%, respectively, had Facebook and Twitter accounts 
(Berishvili, 2018). Despite the contested role of Vkontakte in the protest mobilization of 2011–12, there is 
an indication that since then the influence of pro-opposition actors on the platform has remarkably 
increased. In 2011–12, the protesters relied mostly on Facebook and Twitter because these two platforms 
contained more political information than those presented in the Russian Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki 
platforms (Gainous et al., 2018; Reuter & Szakonyi, 2015; White & McAllister, 2014). There are indications 
that by 2017, the situation had changed. For instance, in 2011, Alexey Navalny’s Vkontakte page had around 
60 followers (Reuter & Szakonyi, 2015). In subsequent years, the number of Navalny’s Vkontakte followers 
surged, reaching 396,000 users in July 2018; in comparison, his Facebook page at that time had 408,000 
followers. His recent posts have received similar numbers of “likes” on both platforms. Because Navalny is 
the most prominent Russian opposition activist as of 2019, and he was the organizer of the protests of 2017, 
his popularity is a good proxy for the influence exerted by the opposition on a given social media platform 
in Russia. 
 
Vkontakte is a suitable case for this study for two primary reasons. First, it is the social media 
platform with the highest share of users in Russia. Thus, the examination of Vkontakte allows capturing the 
patterns of social media news consumption that is more representative of the general Russian population 
than the analysis of other platforms would. Second, it has a significant presence of pro-opposition actors. 
This proves that Vkontakte can be a relevant channel for the spread of antigovernment information and for 
protest mobilization. Therefore, the platform is worth investigating with regard to the possible effects of 
SNS in authoritarian states. Besides, in contrast to the cases of Facebook and Twitter, selective exposure 
and polarization on Vkontakte have not yet been explored in detail. Finally, because of less restrictive API 
limits, Vkontakte allows for the gathering of more data about more representative samples of users than 
Facebook and Twitter currently do (see Data and Methods section), making it a valuable source for 
communication research. 
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
In authoritarian states, social media can be a vital censorship circumvention channel. The 
decentralized nature of SNS makes it difficult for the state to monitor all the content spread through them. 
Thus, they allow for the spread of government criticisms and the news that are censored by the government-
controlled mainstream media. For this reason, people in media environments with limited freedom tend to 
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seek information online (Behrouzian, Nisbet, Dal, & Çarkoğlu, 2016). There is evidence that in countries 
with nonfree media systems (Reporters Without Borders, 2018), higher percentages of citizens rely on social 
media for the news. In the majority of countries included in the Reuters Digital News Report (Newman et 
al., 2018), around 50% of the people claimed they access the news on SNS. In authoritarian states or those 
with nonfree media, such as Turkey, Singapore, or Hungary, the percentage is much higher than average, 
reaching about 70%. Russia was not included in the Reuters Digital News Report, so it is impossible to 
directly compare the statistics in Russia with those of other authoritarian states. Furthermore, the Reuters 
Digital News Report relies on survey data and SNS there include multiple platforms. This study focuses on 
directly observed digital trace data from a single platform. The discrepancies make it difficult to use Digital 
News Report data as a benchmark to assess how the share of news-interested Russian Vkontakte users 
compares with global averages. Hence, here I formulate a research question about the percentage of news-
interested users on Vkontakte, and refrain from hypothesizing how high it might be in comparison with other 
countries: 
 
RQ1: How many Russian users of Vkontakte subscribe to news pages? 
 
Though the Russian state has tightened its control over the Internet since 2011, the opposition still 
manages to use SNS to spread information critical of the government and mobilize people for the protests, 
as shown by the 2017 campaign. At the same time, the social-media-enabled campaigns in both 2011–12 
and 2017 failed to achieve their declared primary goals (new and fair Duma elections in 2011–12 and an 
investigation into the corruption affairs of Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev in 2017). Nonetheless, 
the 2017 protests helped increase Navalny’s recognition and popularity, and his team’s Anti-Corruption 
Foundation currently has offices all over the country. Analysis of Navalny’s 2018 presidential campaign 
shows that, given the obstacles faced by Navalny and his team, their mobilization power was impressive, 
but the movement still remained marginal in terms of the share of population reached and mobilized by 
their messages, largely due to overall political apathy (Dollbaum, Semenov, & Sirotkina, 2018). I suggest 
that the divide between the politically mobilized pro-opposition minority, including those reached and 
mobilized by Navalny’s campaigns, and the apathetic majority that exists in Russian society is reflected on 
Vkontakte as well. In this regard, I present the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: On Vkontakte, a minority of users expose themselves to politicized content from nongovernmental 
actors more than users from other groups do. 
 
In Russia, both progovernment and pro-opposition actors struggle to gain more influence on social 
media (see, e.g., Spaiser, Chadefaux, Donnay, Russmann, & Helbing, 2017). The state attempts to push 
forward its agenda through dedicated groups and pages of state-controlled media on SNS. The opposition 
and the independent press strive to circumvent censorship by disseminating their messages on social media 
platforms. The conflict between the two groups and their respective agendas is evident. The selective 
exposure phenomenon in such a situation could lead to the increased polarization in news consumption, 
where each group’s supporters would avoid the media sources that they perceive as belonging to a “different 
camp.” Building on this, I propose the second hypothesis: 
 
H2: News consumers on Vkontakte are polarized along progovernment versus pro-opposition lines. 
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Data and Methods 
 
This study is based on data about the public pages followed by Vkontakte users. Data were collected 
in May–June 2018 through the Vkontakte open API using the R programming language and the vkR package 
(Sorokin & Antonov, 2016). I collected a data sample of 55,344 randomly chosen Russian Vkontakte users 
and the public pages they follow. To avoid sampling bias, the data were collected based on a computer-
generated random sample of numeric user IDs, which were then filtered to correspond only to users who 
identified Russia as their country of residence on their public profiles. This technique allowed me to draw a 
representative sample of Russian Vkontakte users in general. Vkontakte assigns user IDs sequentially, based 
on the date when a user registered on the platform (the first registered account has ID number 1, the 500th 
account is assigned 500, and so on2). For this study, I generated a random sample of 250,000 numeric IDs 
from 0 to 460 million, queried the data on them, and extracted the Russian users. At the time of the data 
collection, there were around 480 million registered users. However, I excluded the IDs of the most recently 
registered 20 million users from the computer-generated sample. The data were collected several months 
after the Russian presidential elections, and there was a high probability that the most recently registered 
accounts might be bots created to alter the social media landscape during the election campaign. 
 
The sample thus had 55,344 Russian users with randomly chosen registration dates. A similar 
sampling technique cannot be applied to Facebook and Twitter. First, in contrast to Vkontakte, they do not 
sequentially assign user IDs (Shontell, 2014; “Twitter IDs,” n.d.). Second, Vkontakte’s API at the time of 
data collection had no limits in terms of the number of calls to it within a specific time frame. Thus, it was 
possible to query the data on many users, select only those who stated Russia as their country of residence, 
and collect the data about the pages they followed, all within two weeks. With the restrictions of Twitter’s 
API (“Rate Limits,” n.d.), the same process could take up to several months. Facebook’s API since 2018 has 
become increasingly restrictive, and it is challenging for researchers to even gain access to collect data 
(Bastos & Walker, 2018). Hence, the novel sampling approach used in this article applies only to Vkontakte 
or other platforms with sequential IDs and preferably less restrictive APIs. 
 
To answer RQ1, I checked how many users out of the initial sample followed media pages and 
popular political blogs. To do so, I compiled a list of Vkontakte pages of the most cited Russian media outlets 
according to the Medialogia report of April 2018 (Medialogia, 2018; when the list was compiled, this was the 
latest publicly available report). Medialogia is an independent company that publishes monthly reports on 
the popularity rankings of Russian media outlets based on the number of citations. The reports cover all 
types of media outlets, ranging from TV channels and radio stations to online media and blogs. For instance, 
the list includes a blog by Alexey Navalny, as well as de facto Russian media outlets that are not officially 
registered in Russia, such as the Latvia-based independent Meduza. I also added to the list the pages of 
media sources that were not included in the Medialogia report, but that had more than 1 million followers 
on Vkontakte. The final list consists of 97 media outlets (see the Appendix). Next, I checked how many 
users from the Vkontakte data set followed at least one of the media sources on the list to calculate the 
percentage of news-subscribing Vkontakte users. 
 
 
2 The full catalogue of Vkontakte users listed by their numeric IDs is available at https://vk.com/catalog.php. 
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The Medialogia (2018) list is quite comprehensive, but does not include the sources that exist only 
in the form of social media pages—for instance, Vkontakte-based political blogs, such as Lentach 
(vk.com/oldlentach). Thus, simple filtering based on the Medialogia list is prone to selection bias. To expand 
the scope of the analysis and gain more insights, I applied network analysis to the sample of 55,344 
Vkontakte users and the data on the pages to which they subscribed. For this analysis, only the public pages 
with at least 10 subscribers in the sample (0.02% of the initial sample of users3) were selected to reduce 
sparsity. This manipulation was necessary because the analysis of the raw data was not feasible. First, it 
would require too much computational power, and without using a supercomputer, the analysis would be 
impossible. Second, for the research questions addressed in this study, only relatively popular pages are 
relevant. In this study, I focus on the pages with a broad reach that have a potential influence on the 
audience; thus, minor pages with a few followers are beyond its scope. 
 
After this manipulation, the number of unique pages in the sample decreased from 864,972 to 
32,800, and the number of users dropped from 55,344 to 48,637. Therefore, the sparsity of the network 
was sufficiently reduced through a significant decrease in the number of pages, making the data 
computationally feasible to analyze. At the same time, the sample size decreased by 12%, which was 
significant. The remaining subset of users was still large enough for the analysis. 
 
Before proceeding to the immediate analysis, I checked whether the page distribution by the 
number of followers in the sample followed the Zipf’s law (also referred to as power law). This was done to 
test for the presence of bots on the data. The popularity distribution should follow the Zipfian distribution 
because following a power-law distribution is a typical property for social network data (Barabási & Albert, 
1999; Muchnik et al., 2013); otherwise, the sample is likely influenced by bots (Rastogi, 2016) or the data 
are corrupted in some other way. Figure 1 shows the density plot of the popularity distribution of the pages 
in the sample, which follows the Zipfian distribution. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the data are not 
influenced by bots. It has to be noted, though, that Rastogi’s (2016) study is not peer reviewed, so the bot-
detection method used here is not properly validated, which is a limitation of this study. However, because 
no accessible tools for bot detection on Vkontakte (similar to Botometer [see https://botometer.iuni.iu 
.edu/#!/] for Twitter) exist, I opted for Rastogi’s method here, even if its validity is not confirmed. 
 
 
3 The benchmark was selected experimentally; this share appeared to be the most optimal when taking into 
account the balance between computational power necessary for the analysis and the share of data omitted 
after this manipulation with the original data set. 
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Figure 1. Density plot—the distribution of pages by the number of followers in the sample. 
 
Of the cleaned subset of 48,637 users and 32,800 pages with at least 10 followers in the sample, 
I built a directed network of the social media users and the pages they followed. Each node represents either 
a user or a social media page. There is an edge between a user node and a page node if the user follows 
the page. I applied an automatic modularity-based community detection algorithm implemented in Gephi 
(Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte, & Lefebvre, 2008) to divide the network into communities based on the 
network structure. The pages inside each community are connected to the pages from the same community 
more than from the others. In the present context, it means that they share audiences with each other more 
than with the pages from different communities. Thus, the users from one community follow significantly 
more pages from it than from the other communities. To test H1, I was explicitly interested whether the 
users who subscribe to politicized content coming from media and actors not associated with Russian 
government would form a separate, distinct group within the broader network structure. By politicized 
content I mean hard news and politically charged messages from independent media such as Meduza, NGOs 
such as Roskomsvoboda and political actors such as Navalny’s team. After the network was divided into 
communities, I examined the top 70–100 (in terms of the number of followers from the sample) social media 
pages in each community to identify the dominant topics addressed by the pages in each group. 
 
To test H2, I focused on news-interested users. I took the subset of users who followed at least 
one media source from the Medialogia (2018) list. I then applied the audience duplication approach (see 
Ksiazek, 2011; Webster & Ksiazek, 2012) to the data. This audience-centric network analysis approach has 
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proven effective for the studies on audience fragmentation and has been successfully applied to different 
types of media outlets, including digital media (e.g., Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017; Mukerjee, Majó-Vázquez, & 
González-Bailón, 2018; Taneja & Webster, 2016). According to the approach, media environments can be 
described as either fragmented or duplicated, depending on the level of the audience overlap between each 
pair of media outlets in the environment. Overlap is the share of the audience using both outlets. If many 
outlets have overlapping audiences, the environment is duplicated. Otherwise, it is fragmented, which might 
indicate the presence of polarization among the audiences. Following the approach, I constructed an 
audience duplication network. Each node represents a media outlet, and there is a connection between two 
nodes if they have overlapping audiences. Because some overlapping could occur by chance (Ksiazek, 2011), 
the level of overlapping has to be beyond the “by chance” threshold. This threshold is determined by 
multiplying the shares of users in the general sample who follow each outlet. In the final network, there is 
a link between two nodes representing them if the observed audience duplication is higher than this 
threshold (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2017; Ksiazek, 2011; Webster & Ksiazek, 2012). I applied an automatic 
community detection algorithm to the final network (Blondel et al., 2008) to determine whether the network 
could be divided into polarized clusters based on the patterns of audience duplication on social media. The 
original approach used unweighted edges in the audience duplication network. However, for the proper 
application of the community detection algorithm, the strength of the connections between the nodes would 




News? No Thanks. 
 
Of the 55,344 users in the sample, only 8,144 (14.7%) followed a page of at least one of the 
major Russian media sources on the Medialogia (2018) list. This answer to RQ1 and possible implications 
of the observed seemingly low share of news-interested users on Vkontakte are further examined in the 
Discussion section. 
 
If Not News, Then What? Jokes, Sex, and Traditional Gender Roles 
 
Figure 2 presents the visualization of the network of the Vkontakte users and the pages they follow.  
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Figure 2. The network of 48,637 Russian Vkontakte users and pages they follow. Detailed 
description of the colors shown is in Table 1. 
 
 
It consists of six communities, as described in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Communities in the Followership Network of Vkontakte Users. 
Color % nodes Main topics addressed by the pages in the community 
Purple 26.0 Humor, cars, technology, men’s fashion, “gangsta style” 
Bright green 23.2 Humor, female fashion, cooking, kids, motherhood 
Blue 17.8 Buy–sell ads, music, movies, work search, sexual partner search, humor 
Orange 13.5 Humor, school, education 
Dark green 11.2 Hard news, politics (pro-opposition stance),4 education, humor 
Pink 8.3 Horoscopes, romantic affairs, popular psychology 
 
 
4 Progovernment pages are scattered around the network and do not form a distinct community; the 
examples are in the text below. 
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The community structure of the Vkontakte network shows a distinct group of users subscribing to 
politicized opposition-leaning content, confirming H1. It is represented by the dark green community and is 
dominated by independent media (e.g., Meduza, Dozhd), bloggers (e.g., kamikadzedead), opposition actors 
(e.g., Alexey Navalny), and NGOs (e.g., Roskomsvoboda). This group contains only 11.2% of the nodes in 
the network, signaling that these users constitute a minority in the network, following H1. This community’s 
users are more likely to subscribe to the pages in it than to those in other communities. The dark green 
community is the only one with a definite political leaning. All the other communities in the network comprise 
rather diverse media and pages, most of which are apolitical. 
 
In contrast to the independent media, the government-controlled ones are not concentrated in one 
community, but are scattered across the network. For instance, the pages of the state-controlled Rossiya 
TV channel and RIA Novosti news agency belong to the purple community, together with entertainment 
media, such as the TNT TV channel. However, the state-controlled Pervyi Kanal (Channel One) is in the 
bright green community, along with the magazines that target mostly female audiences, such as 
Cosmopolitan. Hence, Vkontakte users seeking politicized content coming from actors not affiliated with the 
Russian government form a distinct group whose selective media diets on Vkontakte differ from those of 
other social media news seekers. 
 
Polarization Is Real 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the duplication network of the pages of media sources from the Medialogia 
(2018) list (see the Appendix). Its centralization score is 12.62%, which is low and indicates a highly 
fragmented network (Ksiazek, 2011). It is divided into three communities. The orange community 
encompasses the pro-opposition actors, NGOs, and independent blogs and media. The purple community 
mostly includes progovernment and state-sponsored media outlets with political content. Finally, the green 
community contains entertainment media. The communities demonstrate that the fragmentation of the 
audiences of Russian media outlets on the Vkontakte platform occurs mainly along political lines, following 
H2 of this study. 
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Figure 3. The network of Russian media outlets and their audience duplication on Vkontakte. 
Orange – mostly independent and pro-opposition media 
Purple – mostly state-owned and progovernment media 
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Summary and Discussion 
 
This study has three major findings: (1) The percentage of news-subscribing Russian users on 
Vkontakte is 14.7%; (2) the users interested in political content coming not from the Russian government 
and/or government-related sources form a distinct group within the broader network of Russian users; and 
(3) Russian news-consuming users are polarized along political lines (progovernment vs. pro-
opposition/independent). 
 
Only 14.7% of the sample of 55,344 users follow a Vkontakte page of one of the major Russian media 
sources or blogs. However, the finding does not necessarily mean that news consumption on social media in 
Russia is low. It does not represent the news consumption of all Russian SNS users. It is unclear whether 
similarly high rates of news avoidance are found among Russian users of Western platforms, such as Facebook 
and Twitter. In 2011–12, they contained a higher share of politically relevant information and were more 
extensively used for protest mobilization than Vkontakte (Reuter & Szakonyi, 2015). It might be that Russian 
news-seeking users still prefer these platforms to the local ones. Testing this assumption would require a 
similar study into the news consumption patterns of Russian Facebook and Twitter users. If that were the case, 
it would be worthwhile to check whether similar differences between Western and local platforms could be 
observed in other authoritarian states because the findings could indicate these platforms’ significant 
differences in their potential for information dissemination and protest mobilization in authoritarian regimes. 
 
The findings from this study cannot be directly compared with the data from other countries listed 
in the Reuters Digital News Report (see Newman et al., 2018), which suggests that in other authoritarian 
states users tend to increasingly seek information online, especially on SNS. This study draws on digital 
trace data from a single platform, whereas the report is based on the survey data about news consumption 
on social media in general. However, questionnaire-based reports from Russia also indicate the relatively 
low share (21%) of citizens who get the news from social media (Levada Center, 2018) in comparison with 
the global averages from the Reuters Digital News Report. Thus, it is safe to conclude that regardless of the 
potential differences between social media platforms, in comparison with other countries, Russia has a low 
percentage of news-interested social media users. The observed effect cannot be attributed only to 
authoritarianism, the lack of press freedom, or censorship. For instance, Turkey, which is currently similar 
to Russia in these respects, has a much higher share of news-seeking users. Still, in some democratic 
countries with free press, the percentages of news-interested users are closer to those of Russia than to 
those of Turkey or other states with censored media environments. For example, in the Netherlands, 
Germany, and South Korea, only 31%, 31%, and 25% of users, respectively, access the news on social 
media. This highlights that the patterns of social media usage are contextual, and more comparative studies 
are necessary to get more generalizable findings. The seeming disinterest of Russian users in political media 
might be associated with overall political apathy in Russia (Dollbaum et al., 2018). 
 
The analysis shows that the minority of news-subscribing users are polarized along political lines. 
In the audience duplication network, independent, publicly owned, and foreign-funded media and pro-
opposition actors form a cluster distinct from the entertainment media and those funded by the Russian 
government or promoting progovernment agenda. This finding highlights the necessity to consider local 
contexts when talking about polarization on SNS. So far, most research on the matter was conducted in the 
5172  Aleksandra Urman International Journal of Communication 13(2019) 
U.S. context (e.g., Bail et al., 2018; Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015; Conover, Gonçalves, Flammini, & 
Menczer, 2012). There were few single-country studies not focused on the U.S. (Grömping, 2014; Gruzd & 
Roy, 2014), and comparative studies are almost nonexistent (Barberá, 2015; Bright, 2018, are notable 
exceptions). The present article demonstrates that polarization can take place across different lines, not just 
left–right/Democrat–Republican dimensions traditionally discussed in the U.S.-focused studies. Comparative 
studies and research in the non-Western context are necessary to make our understanding of polarization 
on SNS more comprehensive. 
 
Though Russian news consumers are highly polarized, there is certain audience overlap between 
progovernment and pro-opposition media pages. It is thus possible to breach the existing divide. Judging 
from the structure of the audience duplication network, it would be easier to bridge through the broadly 
circulated media from different camps, such as Forbes, Kommersant, and Izvestia, than through less popular 
media and blogs, such as Tsargrad or Mediazona. The media outlets with a broader reach are located closer 
to the center of the network, thus sharing higher percentages of audiences with the media from other camps 
than the minor sources on the fringe of the network. Another important finding is that though the Russian 
user-followership network (see Figure 2) is divided into several communities, including a distinct group of 
users subscribing to politicized content from the sources not affiliated with Russian government in any way, 
most of these communities include humorous pages. This means that even nonengaged users who are 
apathetic toward the news and political information can potentially be reached by activists and mobilized 
through the popular humorous pages on the network. In fact, this may already be happening, and users 
who prefer entertaining content to hard news may be exposed to political messages as well if humorous 
pages circulate politically charged jokes. Because conducting content analysis of these pages was not within 
the scope of this study, it is not possible to test this idea, which is a limitation of this study. 
 
Another limitation is that the study includes only the examination of the users’ subscription 
patterns, not their sharing behavior or friendship ties. Additional analyses have to be conducted to uncover 
whether users with different political orientations and levels of political engagement communicate 
predominantly with those whose characteristics are similar to theirs or whether different groups are 
interconnected through friendships or form echo chambers, as well as whether polarization can be mitigated 
through active sharing. 
 
Though it is not the focus of the present study, I must note that the network structure of the Vkontakte 
data hints at a strong gender divide among Russian users. The two largest communities identified by a 
modularity-based algorithm, the purple and the bright green (see Figure 2), represent interests traditionally 
associated with male and female roles. The orange community seemingly includes high school students and 
young people, as it comprises many pages with school-related humor and preparation materials for state 
exams. Unsurprisingly, the orange community is located close to the pro-opposition, dark green one within the 
network structure since high school students and young people have been among the most active participants 
of the protests in Russia in recent years. The network structure thus hints at the presence of not only political 
but possibly also gender and generational divides in media consumption on Vkontakte in Russia. These might 
be seen as additional dimensions of polarization, showing that it is not necessarily limited to the political one. 
I suggest the findings of this study underscore the argument that for better understanding of the phenomena, 
more studies with evidence from diverse contexts and platforms are necessary. 
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Table A1. Media from Medialogia That Were Included in the Analysis. 
# Transliterated Name Short Description 
1 Telekanal TNT entertainment TV channel 
2 Radio ENERGY (NRJ) entertainment radio station 
3 RIA NOVOSTI Russian state sponsored news agency 
4 LIFE Novosti private news media 
5 Lentach opposition-leaning social media page that 
aggregates news 
6 Pervyi Kanal progovernmental (Russian state sponsored) TV 
channel 
7 Nash Futbol Our Football, entertainment (sports) media 
8 AdMe.ru entertainment media 
9 Radio DFM entertainment radio 
10 Klub National Geographic Rossiya NatGeo Russia 
11 TASS progovernmental (Russian state sponsored) 
news agency 
12 Interfax private news agency 
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13 RBK private news media 
14 Novosti RT na russkom Russia Today, Russian edition, progovernmental 
(Russian state sponsored) news media 
15 Gazeta.ru news media, belongs to Rambler Media Group 
16 Gazeta.ru news media, belongs to Rambler Media Group 
17 Komsomolskaya Pravda—KP.RU private news media, progovernment-leaning 
18 Fontanka.ru private news media from St. Petersburg 
19 Dni.ru: Novosti news media, owned by an NGO with ties to the 
government 
20 Znak.com private news media, Yekaterinburg region 
21 Meduza private news media, opposition-leaning, de jure 
is registered and operates in Latvia 
22 Moskva 24 TV Channel about Moscow, owned by Russian 
government 
23 BBC News—Russkaya Sluzhba BBC BBC Russian Service 
24 BIZNES ONLINE | Novosti Kazani I Tatarstana private news media, focus on Tatarstan region 
25 IZ.ru—Izvestiya news media, owned by National Media Group 
that has ties to the Russian government 
26 Mediazona private news media, opposition leaning 
27 Utro.Ru private news media 
28 Svobodnaya Pressa private news media, opposition leaning, right 
wing 
29 Mediazona private news and entertainment media, 
opposition leaning 
30 Volga News—Novosti Samary private news media, Samara Region 
31 Kruglosutochnye novosti Yekaterinburga E1.RU private news media, Yekaterinburg region 
32 VESTI.ru | ROSSIYA 24 progovernmental (Russian state sponsored) TV 
channel 
33 Realnoe Vremya private news media, Tatarstan region 
34 Podmoskovye Segodnya private news media, Moscow region 
35 78 | NOVOSTI private news media, St. Petersburg region 
36 Novye Izvestia private news media 
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37 Argumenty Nedeli private news media, progovernment leaning 
38 NEWSru.com private news media 
39 VSE42.RU Novosti Kemerovo Nozokuznetsk 
Kuzbass 
private news media, Kemerovo region 
40 RIDUS private news media, progovernment 
41 The Bell private news media, opposition leaning 
42 Anew— news aggregator 
43 Komanda Navalnovo Team Navalny, Alexey Navalny and his 
supporters’ page where, among other things, 
content of his blog and YouTube channel is 
shared 
44 Ilya Varlamov blogger Ilya Varlamov’s page, opposition leaning 
45 Telekanal TSARGRAD private TV channel, right wing 
46 Republic private news media, opposition leaning 
47 The Village private entertainment media 
48 Novoe Vremya. The New Times private news media, opposition leaning 
49 Pravda.Ru private news media, owner has ties to the 
government 
50 Zhurnal “Nozh” private entertainment media 
51 InoSMI Russian translations of foreign media articles, 
sponsored by Russian government 
52 Afisha private entertainment media, owned by Rambler 
Media Group 
53 The Insider private news media, opposition leaning 
54 Vzglyad news media, owned by an NGO with ties to 
Russian government 
55 Radio 1—Pervoe Podmoskovnoe radio station, Moscow region 
56 BFM business news radio station, belongs to Rumedia 
holding 
57 Vesti FM news radio station, progovernment 
58 Kommersant FM radio station, owned by Alisher Usmanov who 
has ties to Russian government 
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59 Radio Svoboda Radio Liberty, U.S. government funded, 
opposition leaning in Russia 
60 Golos Ameriki—Voice of Amerika U.S. government funded, opposition leaning in 
Russia 
61 Ekho Moskvy private news media and radio station, opposition 
leaning 
62 Govorit Moskva 94.8 fm private radio station, Moscow region 
63 Radio Sputnik Sputnik radio station, Russian government 
funded 
64 Radio Komsomolskaya Pravda private radio station, progovernment leaning 
65 NTV TV Channel, owned by Gaprom media 
66 REN TV | News TV channel, owned by National Media Group 
that has ties to the Russian government 
67 Telekanal “Zvezda” TV Channel, partially controlled by the Russian 
Defense Ministry 
68 Telekanal Dozhd Private TV channel, opposition leaning 
69 Telekanal i klub Moya Planeta private TV channel, nature and traveling 
70 TV Tsentr state-run TV channel 
71 Telekanal Rossiya-Kultura state-sponsored TV channel, entertainment 
72 Pyatyi Kanal | Novosti TV channel, owned by National Media Group 
that has ties to the Russian government 
73 Telekanal “Rossiya” state-owned TV channel 
74 Snob private entertainment and news media, 
opposition leaning 
75 Cosmopolitan Russia  
76 Esquire Russia  
77 Forbes Russia  
78 Elle  
79 Harper’s Bazaar Russia  
80 Zhurnal “Vokrug Sveta” entertainment media, nature, tourism, and 
traveling 
81 Domashnyi Ochag entertainment media 
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82 “Ekspert” Online private business media 
83 StarHit. Zhurnal Andreya Malakhova entertainment media 
84 SNC Russia  
85 Playboy Russia  
86 Hello! Russia  
87 Tatler Russia  
88 Zhurnal Karavan Istorii entertainment media 
89 Nezavisimaya Gazeta private news media 
90 Kommersant news media, owned by Alisher Usmanov who 
has ties to Russian government 
91 VEDOMOSTI private business media 
92 Rossiyskaya Gazeta news media, owned by Russian government 
93 Moskovskiy Komsomolets (MK) private media 
94 Novaya Gazeta private news media, opposition leaning 
95 Parlamentskaya Gazeta  
96 Argumenty I Fakty/aif.ru news media, owned by the government of 
Moscow 
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Abstract: In our paper we examine the ideological segregation among Ukrainian users in online news
communities, using as a case platform Vkontakte, the largest social networking site in post-socialist
countries.  Using a large sample of Vkontakte data,  we investigate  how significant  the presence of
partisan news communities on social media is in the case of a society experiencing transition towards
datafied media industries; additionally, we discuss the factors that predict users’ interest in partisan
online  content.  Our  findings  suggest  that  despite  their  insignificant  numbers,  partisan  news
communities attract substantial  attention from Ukrainian users; furthermore,  the audiences of these
communities show minimal overlap, thus indicating that they can encourage the formation of isolated
ideological cliques – or “echo chambers” – and increase societal polarization. We also establish that the
region of residence is the most important predictor of selective consumption of pro-Ukrainian or pro-
Russian partisan news content.
Introduction
The advent of digital media, in particular, social networking sites (SNS), has a significant impact on
news consumption worldwide. The decreased costs of content production and distribution together with
the  adoption  of  data-driven  techniques  for  user  profiling  and  targeting  allow both  traditional  and
alternative news providers to reach their audiences through a multitude of socially mediated channels
and formats.  However,  the  growing digitization of  news industries  also  raises  numerous concerns,
varying from the possible abuses of users’ personal data and privacy by news providers (Helberger,
2016; Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., 2017) to the manipulation of the public sphere through fake news
and disinformation (Allcot and Gentzkow, 2017; Tandoc, Lim and Ling, 2017; Lazer et al., 2018).
One of the major concerns with regard to the use of SNS in the context of news consumption is
related to the threat of ideological segregation - i.e. the tendency among consumers to limit themselves
to the content which is likely to confirm their earlier views (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011; Flaxman,
Goel and Rao, 2016). Frequently discussed in the context of “selective exposure” (Stroud, 2008), “filter
bubbles” (Pariser, 2011) and “echo chambers” (Sunstein, 2017), ideological segregation can undermine
the shared public agenda by leading to the formation of isolated social groups, which nurture biases and
limit societal participation of their members. It can also facilitate the formation of discriminatory views
and subsequent radicalization by diminishing the exposure to the opposing opinions; such a threat is
particularly pronounced in the case of societies characterized by a high degree of polarization (e.g., in
the case of a political crisis or a military conflict).
A number of academic studies (Saez-Trumper, Castillo and Lalmas, 2013; Hahn, Ryu and Park,
2015;  Flaxman,  Goel  and  Rao,  2016)  use  exposure  to  partisan  news  content  as  an  indicator  of
ideological segregation.  Hahn, Ryu and Park (2015) show that subscription to accounts of specific
news outlets  on Twitter  follows partisan lines and is  influenced by demographic variables such as
gender and age. Similarly, Flaxman, Goel and Rao (2016) note that users regularly reading partisan
news content online tend to expose themselves only to a single side of ideological spectrum. Gruzd and
Roy (2014) suggest that selective exposure on social media can increase partisanship and polarization,
which, in our view, is especially alarming for societies with the high degree of political polarization.
In our study, we are looking at how online news consumption interacts ideological segregation
in Ukraine. Our choice of the case study is motivated by two major reasons: first, Ukraine is a country
in transition in terms of digital innovations and their adaptation by the news market. Similarly to most
post-Soviet countries, Ukraine is characterized by the lower Internet penetration rate compared with
Western Europe (Kharchenko, 2016); however, the country currently experiences a fast development of
Internet  infrastructure  (Freedom House,  2017)  together  with  an  explosive  growth  of  IT industries
(Kirilenko and Tyshchuk, 2018). By examining the case of Ukraine, we strive to go beyond the current
focus on the small set of Western countries characterized by the high level of technological innovations
as  well  as their  legislative regulations  and to produce observations which can be applied to other
countries which undergo a similar transition towards datafied media industries. 
Second,  since  2014  Ukraine  experiences  the  conflict  between  the  central  government  and
separatist  forces  backed  by  Russia.  Under  the  conditions  of  limited  information  supply  from the
conflict  zone  caused both  by  censorship  and limited  possibilities  for  the  journalists’ access  to  the
frontline, digital media, in particular, SNS, turn into a major source of news both in Ukraine and in
separatist republics (Pantti, 2016; Makhortykh and Sydorova, 2017). While online news channels are
less susceptible to censorship and authorities’ control, many of them are dominated by pro-Ukrainian
and pro-Russian partisan media outlets, leading to the significant biases in their coverage of the conflict
and the subsequent polarization of the Ukrainian public (Zhukov and Baum, 2016; Karamshuk, Lokot,
Pryymak  and  Sastry, 2016).  Often,  these  news  channels  are  also  instrumentalized  as  a  means  of
information warfare, being used for the distribution of fake and propagandist content and stigmatization
of the political opponents (Khaldarova and Pantti, 2017). 
Based on this, we argue that the case of Ukraine is of particular interest in studying the impact
of SNS on online news consumption under the condition of high ideological segregation and intense
information warfare.  To achieve this  purpose,  we examine how a large sample of Ukrainian users
consume digital news content on Vkontakte, a Russian SNS which remains highly popular in Ukraine
despite the ban introduced by the Ukrainian authorities. By doing so, we specifically address three
aspects  related  to  news  consumption  on  SNS.  First,  we  compare  the  visibility  of  online  news
communities,  in  particular,  the  ones  devoted  to  partisan  news  content,  with  other  types  of  SNS
communities  (e.g.  entertainment-related  ones).  Second,  we  examine  if  partisan  news  communities
actually  lead  to  ideological  segregation  (e.g.  by  creating  conditions  for  the  formation  of  “echo
chambers”).  Third,  we identify contextual factors (e.g.  geographic and demographic variables) that
predict users’ interest in pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian partisan news content.
Theoretical background
In today’s media ecologies, SNS constitute an integral component of the process of news distribution
and consumption. A growing number of media organizations and journalists employ SNS as a part of
their content distribution routines extending their reach and adopting novel news formats (Newman,
2011; Russell, 2011; Thurman and Schifferes, 2012). The use of SNS allows users to engage with news
in  a  multitude  of  ways  by  commenting,  liking,  and  sharing  specific  stories  across  their  personal
networks (Hermida et al., 2012). By navigating these networks of contacts and connecting to other
people and communities, SNS users are able to expand their information diets by selecting stories to
read instead of selecting news outlets (Messing and Westwood, 2014); however, these novel selection
capabilities also undermine the agenda-setting potential of legacy outlets and facilitate the distribution
of fake and manipulative content, which can increase societal polarization. 
The content provided through SNS, however, is not limited exclusively to news; instead, as de
Zuniga, Jung, and Valenzuela (2012) note, online content often focuses on entertainment and not public
affairs. This argument is supported both by user surveys (Nielsen and Schrøder, 2014) and large-scale
studies of SNS content, for instance on Twitter (Rieder and Gerlitz, 2013), which find that only a small
portion of content is devoted to news and that users themselves do not necessarily view SNS as a major
means of finding news. Similarly, the analysis of user behaviour indicates a small percentage of online
news-consumers contrasting with the higher self-reported values of news consumption (Flaxman, Goel
and Rao, 2016; Kleppe and Otte, 2017)
The contradiction between the significant potential of SNS as a means of news distribution and
the uneven degree of actual realization of this potential prompts the necessity to assess the presence of
news content within specific platforms compared with other types of content. Such an assessment of
content preferences is essential for understanding political implications of a specific medium through
which the content is consumed (Prior, 2005). Consequently, we argue that comparing the distribution of
news and non-news content is  important for assessing the role of SNS in the context of partisan news
consumption online. Hence, the first research question we address in our paper:  
RQ1:  What  is  the  place  of  news  content,  including  partisan  news  content,  on  Vkontakte
compared with other types of content (e.g. entertainment)?
Following the identification of the overall place of online news content on Vkontakte, we move
towards  examining its  impact  on partisan  news consumption1 and  assessing  if  it  actually  leads  to
ideological segregation. Following earlier studies, we interpret ideological segregation as a tendency of
users to consume disparate news content based on their pre-existing views that leads to the formation of
fragmented news communities (Flaxman, Goel and Rao, 2013; 2016). However, unlike  Flaxman, Goel
and Rao (2013), who use audience-based approach to identify partisan slant of specific news outlets
and differentiated between pro-Republican and pro-Democratic outlets, we followed Hahn, Ryu and
Park (2015) and adopted content-based approach2 to identify partisanship of specific SNS communities.
We also  differentiated  between  pro-Ukrainian  and pro-Russian  partisan  communities,  because  this
construct is particularly applicable for measuring partisanship in Ukraine in the context of the current
Russian-Ukrainian conflict (Karamshuk et al., 2016).
The increase in the levels of audience fragmentation is a prominent concern in connection to
news consumption on SNS. It causes moral panic related to the perspective of the formation of isolated
ideological communities in the form of “filter bubbles” (Pariser, 2011) or “echo chambers” (Sunstein,
2017). The division of the audience into isolated clusters can lead to the ideological segregation, which
is detrimental to the shared public sphere and increase societal polarization; in the longer perspective,
1 Following existing studies on media consumption in Ukraine in post-2014 period (Gruzd and Tsyganova, 2015; 
Karamshuk et al., 2016) we use the term “partisan” to denote news content which has strong pro-Ukrainian or pro-
Russian leaning.
2 This decision is explained by limited applicability of the audience-based approach in the context of our study, in 
particular considering limited amount of information about geographical location of Vkonakte users (see more detailed 
discussion of data limitations in Methodology section) together with massive relocation of Ukrainian population 
triggered by the conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Rushing, 2017) that complicates the identification of partisanship based on 
earlier voting patterns.
ideological segregation can result in radicalization and reinforcement of internal divides, which can
erode the foundations of democratic systems (Beaufort, 2018).
The  concerns  about  the  impact  of  online  news  consumption  on  audience  fragmentation,
however,  so far  have found little  empirical support (Zuiderveen Borgesius et  al.,  2016).  Instead,  a
number of studies (Flaxman, Goel and Rao, 2016; Mukerjee,  Majó-Vázquez and González-Bailón,
2018)  demonstrate  that  communities  of  digital  news  consumers  do  not  form  isolated  ideological
clusters, but their audiences instead frequently overlap with each other. Mukerjee, Majó-Vázquez, and
González-Bailón (2018) show that audience networks are often centred around digital outlets of legacy
media, which have disproportional reach compared with other outlets; in particular, the more partisan
ones.  Similar  observations  are  reported  by  Flaxman,  Goel,  and  Rao  (2016)  who  argue  that  news
consumption on social media does not only reinforce mainstream - and non-partisan - interpretations
but also allows users to expose themselves to opposing views and diversify their information diets.  
At  the  same  time,  the  majority  of  studies  mentioned  above  focus  on  Western  democratic
societies, which are often characterized by rather low degrees of ideological segregation. Even in the
case of the US, where the degree of partisanship is high, society is less ideologically segregated than in
many non-Western countries, which suffer from extreme political polarization. Romensky et al. (2018)
note that in these non-Western contexts ideological segregation has a significant detrimental effect on
the public sphere, leading to the escalation of hate crimes, political instability and violence; in some
cases, it can also result in armed conflicts, such as the one currently occurring in Eastern Ukraine.
Under such extreme conditions, not only the impact of ideological segregation is more visible than in
the case of democratic systems, but also the necessity to deal with it is significantly more pressing as
the persistence of segregated communities can lead to the aggravation of hostilities and undermine
conflict resolution efforts (Hoffmann, 2014; Lynch, Freelon and Aday, 2016). 
For these reasons, we emphasize the importance of advancing research on potential polarizing
effects  of  online  news  consumption  beyond  the  current  focus  on  Western  media  systems  and,
specifically, towards the societies which are already characterized by the high degrees of partisanship.
In this vein, we align with several existing studies (Gruzd and Tsyganova, 2015; Duvanova, Semenov,
and Nikolaev, 2015; Karamshuk et al., 2016) and suggest using the case of Ukraine to examine if under
the condition of high ideological segregation online news outlets in the respective society turn into
isolated partisan communities or their audiences still overlap, thus enabling the exposure of readers to
different opinions on the ongoing strife. Thus, the second research question we discuss in the paper is: 
RQ2: Is the consumption of partisan news content accompanied by the formation of isolated
ideological communities (i.e. “filter bubbles”)?
Lastly, we examine the factors influencing user involvement with partisan news sources, which
is another urgent subject of academic inquiry on online news consumption (Hahn, Ryu and Park, 2015;
Mitchell, Gottfried and Matsa, 2015; Taneja, Wu and Edgerly, 2018). Taneja, Wu and Edgerly (2018)
note the role of age in their analysis of online news consumption by baby boomers and millennials:
despite a number of similarities between two age groups, the former tended to consume news from the
digital outlets of legacy media and favoured more conservative outlets, whereas the latter preferred
more liberal news sources. At the same time, Mitchell, Gottfried and Matsa (2015) found that older
users are inclined to consume news aligning with their views more than younger news consumers. By
contrast, some other demographic variables (e.g. gender (Chyi and Lee, 2012) seem to have a limited
impact both on online news consumption in general and partisan news consumption in particular.
In the case of Ukraine, Duvanova, Semenov, and Nikolaev (2015) emphasize the importance of
geographic factors - i.e. the region where the user lives - on online partisanship. The significance of
these specific factors is related to the regional divide of the Ukrainian political sphere, in particular,
southeast versus northwest geographical division between pro-Russian and pro-Western voters (Clem
and Craumer, 2008; Duvanova, Semenov and Nikolaev, 2015). In the case of online news consumption
through SNS, these distinctions translate in the differences in information diets which can potentially
lead  to  the  ideological  segregation  between  users  from  different  regions  (Duvanova,  Nikolaev,
Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, and Semenov, 2016).  
In our article, we use data on demographic and geographic factors to analyze of these factors
influence user involvement with partisan news communities on Vkontakte. Additionally, we employ
data on linguistic factors – i.e. if the users communicate in Ukrainian, Russian, or both languages. The
importance of the language factor is attributed to the specific Ukrainian content, where the choice of a
certain language is often viewed as an identity marker that makes it an important element of identity
politics (Charnysh, 2013). It also aligns with existing observations on the significant difference in the
way the events in Ukraine, in particular related to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and its background,
are presented in different language streams on SNS (Etling, 2014; Lyebyedyev and Makhortykh, 2018).
Consequently, we examine these three categories of factors – demographic, geographic and linguistic –
to provide a more detailed assessment of possible predictors of the Ukrainian users’ interest in partisan
content. Thus, the third research question we examine in our article is:
RQ3: What is the relationship between demographic, geographic, and linguistic factors and the
consumption of pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian partisan news content?
Methodology
Similar  to  earlier  studies  on  ideological  segregation  in  the  region  (Gruzd  and  Tsyganova,  2015;
Duvanova,  Nikolaev,  Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy,  and  Semenov,  2016),  we  used  data  from Vkontakte,  a
popular Russian social media platform. Despite its ban in 2017 by the Ukrainian authorities, Vkontakte
remains the 7th most popular website in Ukraine (Alexa, 2018) with approximately 9 million active
users (Tikhonova, 2018). Besides its popularity in the state-controlled parts of Ukraine, Vkontakte is
extensively used in the separatist state formations in Eastern Ukraine as well as Crimea (Szwed, 2016)
for distributing partisan news content offering interpretations of the situation in Ukraine alternative to
the ones provided by the mainstream Ukrainian outlets.
Using Vkontakte API, in June 2018 we collected publicly available data about a large sample of
users from Ukraine (n = 50,702) together with the information about online communities these users
are subscribed to. To avoid selection bias, we used a random sample of users. First, we generated a
random  sample  of  numerical  user  ids  and  then  filtered  out  of  it  only  the  Ukrainian  users.  For
identifying if a user is from Ukraine, we relied on Vkontakte profile data; specifically, we used profile
sections which allow users to self-report their country of living and included in the final sample users
who stated that their country of living is Ukraine. For each user in the final sample, we extracted the
data from users’ profiles about their gender, age, languages they speak and their geographic location3;
for the latter, we relied on Vkontakte profile fields which allow users to state the country and city
where they live. Until now, Vkontakte identifies insurgent-controlled territories in Eastern Ukraine as
part of Ukraine, so our sample included Vkontakte users from these regions; in the case of Crimea the
situation  is  more  complicated  as  Vkontakte  attributes  the  peninsula  differently  depending  on  the
country of living stated in the user profile. 
After collecting user data, we used qualitative content analysis to analyze communities to which
Ukrainian users’ subscribed. Using inductive coding, we classified all communities which had more
than  100  members  from  the  initial  sample  (n  =  4,219)  according  to  the  type  of  content  these
communities promote. While doing so, we removed from the sample deleted or blocked communities
(n = 24), so the final sample of the communities is slightly smaller (n = 4,195). Our classification
consists  of  five  community  types:  1)  commercial:  communities  focused  on  advertising  specific
services  or  goods  (e.g.  gepur  and  clothes_staff;  2)  entertainment:  communities  distributing
3
 These data are subjected to usual limitations of optional self-reporting user profile data which often vary in quality
and consistency (Irani, Webb, Li and Pu, 2009; Chen, Kaafar, Friedman and Boreli, 2012). In the case of our sample, these 
limitations are reflected in often inconsistent reporting of demographic (e.g. age and gender) and linguistic (e.g. languages 
spoken) variables by Vkontakte users. One possible way of dealing with these limitations, which we consider for the future 
work, is the use of cross-platform profile validation (e.g. by extracting additional data from the profiles of sampled users 
from other SNS such as Odnoklassniki); however, in addition to technical difficulties of such validation (e.g. limitations of 
APIs of other regional SNS), the practical implementation of such task is impeded by the frequent use of pseudonyms, in 
particular under the threat of legal repercussions of subscribing to partisan news communities in Ukraine and Russia. 
entertainment  content  such  as  jokes  or  music  (e.g.  exclusive_muzic and  chotkiy_paca);  3)  news:
communities  informing  users  about  current  events  in  Ukraine  and/or  abroad  (e.g.  tsnua  and
strelkov_info); 4) politics: communities devoted to political actors and parties (e.g. poroshenko.petro);
and 5)  technical: communities focused on providing professional consultancy and help in relation to
the technical aspects of Vkontakte (e.g. team and ua). The classification was done by two coders, each
of whom coded 2,109 and 2,110 communities respectively; then, each coder coded 420 (20 percent)
communities  coded by the  other  coder  to  assess  the degree  of  intercoder  reliability.  The resulting
estimation of intercoder reliability measured with Krippendorff's alpha is 0.94 which suggests that the
degree of intercoder reliability is high.
Following the classification of communities by type, we focused on the news communities and
examined each of them to determine if the community promotes partisan or non-partisan content. In the
former case, we also noted if the community distributes pro-Ukrainian (e.g. by expressing unequivocal
support of Ukrainian right-wing groups such as Pravyi Sector) or pro-Russian partisan content (i.e.
expressing unequivocal support of pro-Russian state formations in Eastern Ukraine, such as Donetsk
and Luhansk People’s Republics, or the annexation of Crimea). Two original coders examined all news
communities  (n  =  112)  and  coded  each  of  them as  pro-Ukrainian,  pro-Russian,  or  neutral.  After
producing  the  classification,  both  coders  examined  the  resulted  lists  together  and  resolved
disagreements through consensus-coding.
After determining the partisan orientation of news communities, we used exploratory network
analysis to determine if partisan news communities form isolated clusters in the Vkontakte community
topography. After identifying the position of news communities within the user-community network,
we analyzed the degree  of  ideological  segregation among the news consumers  using the  audience
overlap approach (Webster and Ksiazek, 2012). This approach has been successfully applied to study
audience fragmentation (Fletcher and Nielsen, 2017), polarization between the audiences of partisan
news outlets (Ksiazek, 2016), and to explore selective exposure among online news-consumers (Nelson
and Webster, 2017; Mukerjee et al., 2018). Using a subset of users who subscribed to at least one news
group from our list (n = 14,899), we constructed a news groups’ audience duplication network based on
the  audience-centric  approach  to  audience  fragmentation.  The  approach  assumes  that  media
environments are either fragmented or duplicated: if audiences of the majority of outlets overlap, then
these  environments  are  duplicated,  whereas  little  overlap  indicates  that  these  environments  are
fragmented and, in some cases, polarized (Ksiazek, 2011; Webster and Ksiazek, 2012). In the resulting
network, each node represents a news group; two nodes are connected if their audiences overlap and
the number of overlapping users is higher than the one which can occur by chance (for details see
Ksiazek,  2011;  Webster  and  Ksiazek,  2012;  Fletcher  and  Nielsen,  2017).  Afterwards,  we  applied
community detection algorithms to analyze the resulting network to see if there are clusters of tightly
connected nodes – i.e. the ones that have a significantly higher audience overlap with each other than
with other news communities.
Finally,  we  analyzed  possible  factors  influencing  users’  subscription  to  partisan  news
communities. Specifically, we looked at self-reported demographic variables (e.g. age and gender) as
well  as  language  preferences  (e.g.  Ukrainian  or  Russian);  furthermore,  we  employed  geographic
variables (i.e. the region where users live), which according to Duvanova et al. (2016) are important
predictors of ideological segregation in Ukraine. Out of 14,899 users subscribed to at least one news
community, only 5,001 provided information about all these variables. Data about these 5,001 users
were used to build a logistic regression model (Ordinary Least Square) to examine variables which can
be significant for predicting subscription to the partisan news groups.
Findings
News  content  within  Vkontakte  media  ecology.  We  started  our  analysis  by  examining  differences
between subscriptions to different types of online communities among Ukrainian users in Vkontakte.
Based  on  the  results  of  our  coding  summarized  in  Table  1,  we  found  that  the  vast  majority  of
communities (95 percent) to which users subscribe are entertainment-oriented and deal with humour,
cooking, and music. By contrast, news communities constitute a rather small number of communities
with 100+ subscribers from our sample: 112 out of 4,206 (around 2.5 percent). Communities related to
political/public actors are even more underrepresented in our sample; the only community we found is
devoted to the current Ukrainian president, Petro Poroshenko. These observations align with earlier
studies (de Zuniga,  Jung, and Valenzuela,  2012; Flaxman, Goel and Rao, 2016) on Western social
media platforms (e.g. Facebook) which argue that news content constitutes only a small proportion of
social media content, thus making the impact of SNS on the news consumption questionable.
Table 1. Vkontakte communities subscriptions by content type
N  of
communities
N  of  unique
subscribers
Average  n  of
subscribers
Entertainment 4,015 39,159 294
News 112 15,717 300
Politics 1 455 455
Technical 12 7,429 926
Commerce 55 7,449 207
Despite the fact that the number of news communities on Vkontakte is relatively small, our
observations  also indicate  that  these communities  are  rather  popular.  Approximately 30 percent  of
Vkontakte users from our sample subscribed to at least one news community, thus suggesting that these
communities are more visible than commerce- or Vkontakte service-oriented ones. In order to identify
possible differences between the audiences of these communities, we examined the distribution of self-
reported user data depending on the type of community. Specifically, we looked at the self-reported
gender and age of users together with the declared knowledge of Russian and Ukrainian languages and
the region where users live. 
Table 2. Vkontakte communities’ subscriptions by content type and demographic variables
Entertainmen
t
News Politics Technical Trade
Age [under 18] 1,540 (9%) 645 (9%) 29 (14%) 291 (9%) 302 (10%)
Age [18-24] 4,861 (29%) 1,988 (30%) 50 (24%) 922 (29%) 953 (30%)
Age [25-29] 3,660 (22%) 1,451 (22%) 47 (23%) 679 (22%) 678 (22%)
Age [30-49] 5,454 (33%) 2,164 (32%) 69 (34%) 1,044 (33%) 998 (32%)
Age [50+] 1,126 (7%) 455 (7%) 11 (5%) 228 (7%) 205 (6%)
Gender [female] 15,049 (54%) 6,118 (54%) 136
(43%)
2,578 (48%) 3181 (60%)
Gender [male] 13,067 (46%) 5,126 (46%) 182
(57%)
2,746 (52%) 2158 (40%)
Language [Russian
only]
394 (8%) 141 (8%) 3 (2%) 90 (7%) 58 (6%)
Language [Russian
& Ukrainian]
1,761 (38%) 760 (40%) 27 (23%) 472 (38%) 358 (40%)
Language
[Ukrainian only]
2,527 (54%) 971 (52%) 88 (75%) 671 (55%) 481 (54%)
Region [Crimea] 756 (2%) 187 (1%) 2 (1%) 83 (2%) 59 (1%)




Region  [East  Ukr;
state-controlled]
5,814 (16%) 2,446 (17%) 32 (11%) 743 (15%) 747 (16%)
Region  [East  Ukr;
insurgent-
controlled]
4,164 (12%) 1,680 (12%) 14 (5%) 514 (10%) 408 (9%)
Region  [South
Ukr]
4,340 (12%) 1,775 (13%) 22 (7%) 614 (13%) 557 (12%)




As Table 2 indicates, the distribution of demographic variables showed little variance between
different types of Vkontakte communities4. The only exception is represented by the politics-related
communities; however, these distinctions can be attributed to the data bias caused by the presence of
only one such community in our sample. For all other types of communities except Vkontakte service-
oriented ones,  users reporting their  gender  as  female are  prevalent;  similarly,  in all  four cases the
majority of users state that their  age is either between 30-49 or 18-24 years. Independently of the
community  type,  more  than  half  users  note  that  they  speak  only  Ukrainian  language  with
approximately  40  percent  mentioning  both  Ukrainian  and  Russian  languages  in  their  profiles.
Relatively little number of users - between 6 and 8 percents -  states that they speak only Russian; such
a  marginal  percentage  of  Russian-only  speakers  can  be  attributed  to  the  increasing  number  of
4
 Such uniform distribution of variables between different community categories can be attributed to the unequal 
amount of information self-reported by users with more active subscribers – i.e. users subscribing to the larger number of 
different communities – being also the ones self-reporting the most information about themselves. 
Russophone Ukrainians switching to Ukrainian language since the beginning of the conflict in Eastern
Ukraine (International Alert, 2017). Surprisingly enough, the number of self-reported bilinguals and
Ukrainian-only speakers was also high among the users from Eastern Ukraine, including the ones in
insurgent-controlled areas.
The geographical distribution of users is similarly consistent between communities’ types. In all
four cases, the majority of users were either from Central or Western Ukraine; such user distribution
reflects general population trends in Ukraine, where these two regions are the most populous. The
number of users from separatist-controlled parts of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea in our sample was
relatively low and varied from 10 to 14 percent of users who state where they live in their profiles. In
the case of Crimea, such low numbers can be explained by the possibility of changing the attribution of
the region to Russia introduced by Vkontakte in 2014. By contrast, the number of users from separatist-
controlled parts of Ukraine was higher than we expected based on the population distribution: with
approximately 3 million people living in DNR and LNR, the number of unique subscribers was the
same as in the case of Southern Ukraine with roughly 6 million inhabitants (DSSU, 2017).
Together,  our  findings  suggest  that  new  communities  constitute  relatively  small  part  of
Vkontakte media ecologies in terms of communities’ number that resonates with earlier studies (de
Zuniga, Jung and Valenzuela, 2012; Nielsen and Schrøder, 2014) arguing that the presence of news
content on SNS – as well as its impact on the public sphere – can be overestimated. At the same time,
we  observe  that  these  communities  attract  rather  significant  attention  from  the  users  with
approximately 30 percent of all users from our sample being subscribed to news content. Our analysis
also did not show significant differences in terms of demographic/geographic profile of subscribers to
different types of communities: independently of the community type, the majority of Vkontakte users
from our sample are Ukrainophone or bilingual speakers from the young (18-24) and middle (30-49)
age groups who come primarily from Western and Central Ukraine.  
Partisan news content on Vkontakte. After examining the general place of news content within
Vkontakte media ecology, we moved towards exploring the role of partisan news content.  Table 3
summarizes the distribution of news communities according to their ideological orientation and the
number of user subscriptions. The summary shows that the majority of news communities promote
non-partisan content; yet, approximately 43 percent of news communities propagate partisan views. In
contrast to the common assumption that Vkontakte is used for spreading pro-Russian propaganda in
Ukraine  (see,  for  instance,  The Economist  (2017)  and Skichko (2017)),  Table  3  suggests  that  the
majority of partisan news communities to which Ukrainian users subscribe actually have pro-Ukrainian
orientation; furthermore, the average number of subscribers is significantly higher for pro-Ukrainian
news communities than for pro-Russian ones. 
Table 3. News communities by ideological orientation
N of communities N  of  unique
subscribers
Average  n  of
subscribers
Neutral 63 11,105 284
Pro-Russian 13 2,131 182
Pro-Ukrainian 36 8,060 369
 
After identifying the distribution of news communities among Ukrainian users, we moved towards
examining user subscriptions to news content on Vkontakte using clustering analysis. Specifically, we
employed a community detection algorithm by Blondel  et  al.  (2008) which resulted in  17 distinct
clusters  (modularity  =  0.562)  shown  on  Fig.  1.  The  modularity  rating  was  verified  with  other
community detection algorithms (e.g. walktrap (Gruzd and Tsyganova, 2015)) that produced similar
estimations. 
Figure 1. The network of Ukrainian Vkontakte users and news communities they follow (divided into
clusters based on the network topology; the size of the nodes is proportional to the number of followers
a  community  has;  network  layout  is  based  on  the  Forced  Atlas  2  algorithm  (Jacomy,  Venturini,
Heymann, Bastian, 2014)
Our examination of the resulting clusters supports earlier observations by Gruzd and Tsyganova
(2015), who found that geography is a strong factor for the modularity classification. Specifically, we
identified distinct clusters which united local news communities from the large Ukrainian cities (e.g.
Odessa, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Lviv). Similarly, we identified a cluster of Luhansk/Donetsk local news
communities; the latter cluster also includes the majority of pro-Russian partisan news communities,
which might indicate the geographic focus of these groups.
We  observed  a  similar  connection  between  partisan  news  communities  and  regional  news
communities in the case of the largest cluster of our network, which ties pro-Ukrainian partisan content
with Western Ukrainian news communities. We also identified two distinct clusters of communities
related  to  legacy  news  organizations  (e.g.  1+1  TV  channel  and  UNIAN  news  agency);  these
communities are grouped together, so potentially there might be a gap between the users who mostly
subscribe to the legacy media news communities and users who consume news produced by alternative
media. Finally, there are a few clusters focused on thematic news (e.g. sport); these clusters are located
in the centre of the graph and act as “bridges” between partisan news communities.
The results of the analysis of the audience fragmentation of these news communities based on
the  audience  overlap  approach  (Webster  and  Ksiazek,  2012)  suggest  that  news  consumption  on
Vkontakte is characterized by rather high partisanship. As Fig. 2 shows, the audience overlap network
of news communities is divided into tightly connected modules; using Louvain community detection
algorithm (Blondel et al. 2008), we calculated the modularity of this network which is equal to 0.412. 
Figure 2. News groups’ audience duplication network
 
The  resulting  graph  shows  clusters  of  pro-Russian  and  pro-Ukrainian  partisan  news
communities located at opposite poles with an in-between cluster of communities related to legacy
media outlets as well as some non-partisan news content (e.g. technology and sport). The output of the
community detection algorithms other than the Louvain algorithm also emphasizes the predominant
presence of three major community clusters: the pro-Ukrainian one, pro-Russian one, and legacy media
one. These algorithms produced the following modularity scores: 0.443 for the Newman-Girvan (2002)
algorithm and 0.46 for the fast greedy algorithm (Clauset et al. 2004). Similarities in the output of
different algorithms prove that our observations concerning the polarization between the subscribers of
the partisan pro-Ukrainian, partisan pro-Russian and traditional media news communities’ are quite
robust.
The findings in this section suggest that partisan news communities constitute less than half of
the  news  communities  in  our  sample.  Pro-Ukrainian  partisan  communities  attract  more  users  on
average compared with non-partisan news communities as well as pro-Russian communities with the
latter having a rather marginal position in terms of the number of users from our sample subscribing to
this  type of communities.  We also found that pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian partisan communities
have rather  distinct  positions within the user-communities network topography and their  audiences
show very limited overlap, thus contradicting the argument by Flaxman, Goel, and Rao (2016) about
SNS encouraging users’ exposure to  the  views  different  from their  own.  A similar  gap  is  present
between the subscribers of communities associated with legacy media and alternative media; together,
these observations suggest that Vkontake does, indeed, enable ideological segregation and that partisan
news communities function as isolated “echo chambers”, whose subscribers have limited possibilities
for experiencing opposing points of view.
Determinants of partisan news consumption. After detecting the low audience overlap between
partisan news communities, we looked at the factors which can explain users’ interest in partisan news
content. Following earlier studies on partisan news consumption in Ukraine (Gruzd and Tsyganova,
2015; Duvanova, Nikolaev, Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, and Semenov, 2016), we assumed that the region in
which users live can be an influential factor; the importance of this specific variable is connected to the
long-term regional divide in Ukrainian political sphere, where western parts of the country tended to
favour  pro-EU  politicians,  whereas  eastern  and  southern  regions  gravitated  towards  pro-Russian
candidates  (Clem  and  Craumer,  2008).  Additionally,  we  considered  the  self-reported  language
capabilities  of  users,  their  age,  and  gender  to  see  if  linguistic  and  demographic  factors  influence
partisan news consumption.
We used regression analysis  to check the statistical  significance of the variables mentioned
above.  We ran two separate  logistic  regressions to  determine which demographic,  geographic,  and
linguistic  variables  can  predict  subscription  to  pro-Russian  and  pro-Ukrainian  partisan  news
communities. As was mentioned earlier, after removing all NAs, we were left with 5,001 users who
provided information about the required variables. Out of these users, 2,784 were subscribed to pro-
Ukrainian  communities  and  only  625  to  pro-Russian  communities.  This,  along  with  the  earlier
observations about the discrepancies between the numbers of pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian partisan
communities  (see  Table  3),  puts  the  wide-spread  statements  about  the  spread  of  pro-Russian
propaganda in Ukraine through Vkontakte (The Economist, 2017) under scrutiny. 
The results of the regression analyses are summarized in Tables 4 and 5. We used different
predictors for each logistic model: the choice of specific predictors in each case was determined by the
level  of  model  fit.  We  performed  likelihood  ratio  tests  and  calculated  McFadden’s  r-squared
(McFadden, 1973) to find the best fitting set of predictors. For the model where a subscription to pro-
Ukrainian partisan news communities was taken as the dependent variable, the best fitting combination
of  independent  variables was Ukrainian language-speaking (binary),  gender  (binary)  and region of
residence (categorical). The latter variable was taken with 7 categories. Besides distinguishing between
4  regions  of  Ukraine  (West,  East,  Center  and  South),  we  also  distinguished  between  Ukrainian-
controlled and separatist-controlled regions in the East and Crimea that was annexed by Russia in 2014.
This division was taken because of the model fit. We also ran models where we did not distinguish
between the separatist-controlled and Ukrainian-controlled regions in the East and Crimea, but they had
a worse fit to the data. The McFadden’s r-squared for the final model is 0.89, which indicates that the
model fits the data decently.
Based on the results of the regression analysis we can state that Ukrainian speakers (i.e. users
who declare on Vkontakte that they speak Ukrainian) are more likely to follow pro-Ukrainian partisan
communities;  similarly,  females  are  more  likely  to  follow pro-Ukrainian  communities  than  males.
Finally, as expected, the declared residence in the separatist-controlled regions and Crimea is a very
strong  negative  predictor  of  subscription  to  pro-Ukrainian  communities.  Residence  in  Ukraine-
controlled eastern regions and in southern regions also is a strong negative predictor of subscription to
pro-Ukrainian communities. The only positive regional predictor of interest in pro-Ukrainian partisan
communities is the residence in Western Ukraine. This observation supports earlier findings about a
strong pro-Ukrainian regional  partisanship in  the western part  of  the country  (Clem and Craumer,
2008). It also suggests that online news consumption patterns of users from Western Ukraine are rather
different from those of users from other parts of the country, who exhibit less interest in pro-Ukrainian
partisan news content.
Table 4. Regression analysis results, predicting pro-Ukrainian partisanship
Dependent variable: Subscription  to  pro-Ukrainian
communities
Independent variable Rating
Language: Ukrainian only 0.364***  (0.089) 
Gender: male -0.196*** (0.061) 
Region [Crimea] -1.438*** (0.283)
Region [East Ukr; DNR] -1.901*** (0.121)
Region [East Ukr; state-controlled] -0.728*** (0.090)
Region [East Ukr; LNR] -2.038*** (0.204)
Region [South Ukr] -0.818*** (0.099)




Akaike Inf. Crit. 6,273.870
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
For the logistic model where a subscription to pro-Russian partisan communities was taken as a
dependent variable, we used age (categorical) and region of residence (categorical, similar to the model
for pro-Ukrainian partisanship) as independent variables. The choice, in this case, was also determined
by  the  model  fit  with  the  mentioned  combination  of  variables  providing  the  best  results  with
McFadden’s  r-squared  equal  to  0.63.  This  model  did not  fit  as  well  as  the one for  pro-Ukrainian
partisanship, but its performance is acceptable since McFadden’s r-squared is still closer to 1 than to 0.
The model shows that young people under 18 years old are more likely to subscribe to pro-Russian
partisan news communities than other age groups. The strongest predictors of interest in pro-Russian
communities  are,  as  expected,  the  declared  residence  in  separatist-controlled  regions  in  Eastern
Ukraine. We also found that the residence in Western Ukraine is a statistically significant predictor of
subscription to pro-Russian communities. This finding might look counterintuitive, considering that the
same factor is also a positive predictor of the subscription to pro-Ukrainian communities; however, it
can be attributed to the higher partisanship among residents of Western Ukraine as well as possible
internal  divisions  along  the  political  lines.  We  plan  to  further  investigate  this  issue  in  follow-up
analysis.
Table 5. Regression analysis results, predicting pro-Russian partisanship
Dependent variable: Subscription to pro-Russian communities
Independent variable Rating
Age [under 18] 0.371** (0.151)
Age [25-29] -0.100 (0.138)
Age [30-49] 0.117 (0.117)
Age [50+] -0.063 (0.189)
Region [Crimea] -0.961 (0.725)
Region [East Ukr; DNR] 1.590*** (0.138)
Region [East Ukr; state-controlled] 0.121 (0.154)
Region [East Ukr; LNR] 1.864*** (0.190)
Region [South Ukr] 0.159 (0.169)




Akaike Inf. Crit. 3,554.445
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Our findings do not provide support to the argument of Taneja, Wu and Edgerly (2018) about
the differences in partisan news consumption being attributed to demographic variables (e.g. different
age categories). Instead, in the case of Ukrainian SNS users, geographical – in particular, the self-
declared  region  of  residence  –  and  linguistic  variables  seem  to  be  particularly  significant,  thus
supporting  earlier  findings  by Duvanova et  al.  (2016) about  the importance  of  these variables  for
political partisanship. These observations suggest that the existing factors of ideological segregation in
the case of Ukraine remain highly relevant for partisan news consumption in online spaces.
Conclusions
In  our  paper,  we  examined  the  ideological  segregation  among  Ukrainian  users  in  online  news
communities using as a case platform Vkontakte, the largest SNS in post-socialist space. Specifically,
we were interested in how significant the presence of (partisan) news content on SNS is in the case of
conflict-ridden societies experiencing the transition towards datafied media industries. Additionally, we
tried  to  assess  to  what  degree  partisan  news  communities  enhance  ideological  segregation  –  i.e.
whether they entrap users within “filter bubbles” (Pariser, 2011) or “echo chambers” (Sunstein, 2017) –
and what the factors which can predict users’ interests towards partisan news content on SNS are.
Our findings  partially  align with a  series of recent  studies  (Flaxman,  Goel  and Rao, 2016;
Zuiderveen  Borgesius  et  al.,  2016;  Mukerjee,  Majó-Vázquez  and  González-Bailón,  2018)  which
suggest that concerns about the potential of SNS to undermine shared public agenda are overrated.
News communities constitute just a small drop in the digital ocean of entertainment content – even in
the  case  of  Ukraine,  where  SNS  assumingly  are  a  major  source  of  information  about  the  recent
developments in the country, in particular in relation to the conflict in Eastern Ukraine.
At the same time, our observations point to the high degree of partisan news consumption on
Vkontakte that contradicts the assumption that SNS encourage exposure to different views and, thus,
counter ideological segregation (Flaxman, Goel and Rao, 2016). Despite the relatively little number of
partisan  news  communities,  almost  two-thirds  of  users  interested  in  online  news  on  Vkontakte
subscribe  either  to  pro-Ukrainian  or  to  pro-Russian  communities;  in  the  former  case,  the  average
number of subscribers is higher compared with non-partisan news communities. Our observations also
indicate that the audiences of partisan news communities do not overlap; instead,  their  subscribers
remain in self-chosen “echo chambers” and have limited possibilities to expose themselves to opposing
viewpoints. Such a selective exposure to a single ideological view increases ideological segregation
and facilitates societal polarization and potential radicalization which is a major concern for already
polarized Ukrainian society.
Finally, our investigation of factors which stimulate user subscription to partisan news content
suggests that variables related to existing ideological divides – i.e. geography- or language-related ones
– tend to  be the strongest  predictors  of  online partisanship.  Unlike other  studies  (Taneja,  Wu and
Edgerly, 2018) which suggest that age tends to be a strong predictor of partisan news consumption
online, we did not find evidence suggesting that younger Ukrainian users are more eager to subscribe to
partisan news content. Instead, our observations suggest that divisions between news consumers on
Vkontakte  reproduce  -  and,  potentially,  reinforce  -  existing  ideological  divides  between  Ukrainian
regions (Duvanova, Semenov, and Nikolaev, 2015).
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of the study, in particular, the use of self-reported
user information on Vkontakte. Unlike traditional surveys, we have limited possibilities for verifying if
the user’s declared age, gender, or language abilities actually correspond to the real state of affairs. This
has limited impact on the detection of user overlap among audiences of partisan news communities;
however, it has significant implications for the analysis of factors influencing users’ interest towards
partisan content. In the future research, we anticipate addressing this limitation by using profile cross-
referencing. 
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